Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 53

Issue 3

Article 6

1988

Casenotes and Statute Notes
Barbara A. Bell
David W. Carstens

Recommended Citation
Barbara A. Bell et al., Casenotes and Statute Notes, 53 J. AIR L. & COM. 839 (1988)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol53/iss3/6

This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law and Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For
more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

TORTS

-

INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY LIMITATION AGREE-

Absent a showing of prejudice to the passenger
by the carrier's technical non-compliance with the baggage claim check provisions of the Warsaw Convention,
or absent a demonstration of wilful misconduct related to
the loss of checked baggage, an air carrier is entitled to
limited liability under the Warsaw Convention. Republic
Nat'l Bank of N. Y v. Eastern Airlines, 815 F.2d 232 (2d Cir.
1987).
MENTS -

On December 13, 1982, Renzo Baronti, a courier for
Republic National Bank of New York (Republic), checked
a bag containing two million dollars United States currency on Eastern Airlines Flight 001 to Lima, Peru.1 The
bag never reached Peru.2 Republic brought this action to
recover the lost currency.3
Republic operated a currency courier service on inter, Republic Nat'l Bank of N.Y. v. Eastern Airlines, 815 F.2d 232, 234 (2d Cir.
1987).
2 Id. at 235.
Id. Republic commenced the action in the Southern District of New York.
Republic Nat'l Bank of N.Y. v. Eastern Airlines, 639 F. Supp. 1410, 1411
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 815 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1987). With regard to the place
where an action may be brought under the Warsaw Convention, Article 28 provides in pertinent part:
(1) An action for damages must be brought, at the option of the
plaintiff, in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,
either before the court of the domicile of the carrier or of his principal place of business, or where he has a place of business through
which the contract has been made, or before the court at the place of
destination.
The Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, openedfor signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No.
876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11, reprintedfollowing 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 (1982) [hereinafter
the Warsaw Convention]. Peru is not a party to the Warsaw Convention. For a
list of parties to the Warsaw Convention see Comment, The Role of Choice of Law in
Determining Damages for InternationalAviation Accidents, 51 J. AIR L. & CoM. 953,
1000 (1986). Thus the action could not be brought in Peru. Further, since Republic was arguing for unlimited liability under the Warsaw Convention, tactically
the United States was a better forum because the United States is known to award
839
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national flights. 4 On December 13, 1982, Republic dispatched Renzo Baronti to accompany two bags containing
a total of 6.5 million dollars on Eastern Airlines Flight
001.- Of the 6.5 million dollars, 4.5 million dollars were
to go to Santiago, Chile. 6 The remaining two million dollars were to go to Lima, Peru. Baronti obtained a ticket
from New York City to Buenos Aires, Argentina from an
Eastern ticket agent. 8 The ticket contained a notice stating that the Warsaw Convention applied to the flight.9
After purchasing his ticket, Baronti approached an Eastern baggage check area and told the attendant that he
needed two baggage claim checks for the high value shipthe highest tort damages in the world. See Kreindler, A Plaintiff's View of Montreal,
33J. AIR L. & COM. 528 (1967).
4 Republic Nat'l Bank ofN.Y, 815 F.2d at 234. In May of 1982, Republic met
with Eastern officials to notify Eastern that Republic would be dispatching couriers to accompany large amounts of currency which would be shipped on Eastern
flights as checked baggage. Although Eastern told Republic it would not accept
liability for currency checked as baggage, Eastern never refused to allow Republic
to check the currency as baggage. Id. Further, Eastern never told Republic that
Eastern's tariff did not allow it to accept money as checked baggage. Republic Nat '
Bank of N. Y, 639 F. Supp. at 1412. Despite Eastern's refusal to accept liability,
Eastern provided Republic with a letter of introduction to assure that Republic's
couriers would receive assistance from Eastern employees. Republic Nat ' Bank of
N.Y., 815 F.2d at 234.
Republic Nat'l Bank ofN. Y, 815 F.2d at 234-35.
Id. at 235.
7

Id. at 234.

8 Id. at 235 n.2. Because both the place of departure (New York) and the destination (Buenos Aires, Argentina) were located in countries which are parties to
the Warsaw Convention, see Comment supra note 3, at 1000-01, the Warsaw Convention applied to the entire flight, including any stops in nonparty countries such
as Peru. Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 1(2).
, Republic Nat ' Bank of N. Y, 815 F.2d at 235. The adequacy of the ticket under
the Warsaw Convention was not contested. The Warsaw Convention requires carriers to deliver a ticket notifying the passenger of the applicability of the Convention and containing certain other details, specifically:
(a) The place and date of issue; (b) The place of departure and of
destination; (c) The agreed stopping places...; (d) The name and
address of the carrier or carriers; [and] (e) A statement that the
transportation is subject to the rules relating to liability established
by [the] convention.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 3(1). The Warsaw Convention further provides that "if the carrier accepts a passenger without a passenger ticket having
been delivered he shall not be entitled to avail himself of those provisions of this
convention which exclude or omit his liability." Warsaw Convention, supra note 3,
art. 3(2).
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ment.' 0 Baronti did not reveal the nature or exact value
of the shipment." Although Baronti did not have the
bags with him, the attendant issued two claim checks to
Baronti.12 The first was a standard Eastern claim check
for Santiago, Chile.' 3 The attendant, however, was unable
to find a standard claim check for Lima, Peru.' 4 Instead,
he substituted a limited release form' 5 which did not contain a notice of the applicability of the Warsaw Convenflight, Baronti's ticket number, or the weight of
tion to the
16
the bag.

Baronti requested and received access to the tarmac to
10Republic Natil Bank of N.Y,

815 F.2d at 235.
1 Id. The Warsaw Convention allows a passenger to declare the value of the
baggage in excess of 250 francs per kilogram, and where appropriate pay a supplementary amount for transportation of the baggage. If the passenger takes
those steps, the carrier can be required to pay the lesser of the declared sum or
the actual value of the baggage to the passenger. Warsaw Convention, supra note
3, art. 22(2).
12 Republic Natl Bank of N.Y, 815 F.2d at 235.
'1 Id. Eastern's standard claim check is a pre-printed form which contains the
destination, baggage identification number, routing codes, and a notice of the
Warsaw Convention's applicability. Id. The adequacy of Eastern's standard claim
check was not at issue in this case.
14 Id.
15 Eastern generally uses its limited release form to release itself from liability
for previous damage to the passenger's checked bags. Id. at 235 n.4.
- Id. at 235. Republic claimed this baggage check was insufficient under the
Warsaw Convention. With respect to baggage checks, the Warsaw Convention
requires:
(1) For the transportation of baggage, other than small personal objects of which the passenger takes charge himself, the carrier must
deliver a baggage check. (2) The baggage check shall be made out in
duplicate, one part for the passenger and the other part for the carrier. (3) The baggage check shall contain the following particulars:
(a) The place and date of issue; (b) The place of departure and of
destination; (c) The name and address of the carrier or carriers; (d)
The number of the passenger ticket; (e) A statement that delivery of
the baggage will be made to the bearer of the baggage check; (f) The
number and weight of the packages; (g) The amount of value declared in accordance with article 22(2); [and] (h) A statement that
the transportation is subject to the rules relating to liability established by [the] convention. (4) . . . [I]f the carrier accepts baggage
without a baggage check having been delivered, or if the baggage
check does not contain the particulars set out in (d),(0, and (h)
above, the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of those provisions of the convention which exclude or limit his liability.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 4.
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meet the armored car carrying the bags containing the
currency. 17 Baronti checked the locks on the bags and attached the claim checks to the bags.' 8 He then told the
Eastern baggage handlers to load Republic's two bags
last.' 9 Baronti, however, allowed the baggage handlers to
load several carloads of late baggage after Republic's
bags.2 o
The first scheduled stop in the flight was Miami, Florida. 2 ' In Miami, Baronti inspected the bags and watched
the baggage handlers replace the bags in the hold.22 The
flight then continued to Peru. The bag destined for Peru
and its contents never reached Peru.2 3
Republic commenced an action against Eastern seeking
to recover the full amount of its lost currency. 24 Eastern
moved for partial summary judgment on the ground that
the Warsaw Convention limits liability for lost baggage. 5
Republic opposed partial summary judgment, claiming
that Eastern was not entitled to limited liability both because Eastern failed to include the information required
by the Warsaw Convention on the baggage claim check,2 6
and because Eastern's failure to adequately protect the
bag from theft constituted "wilful misconduct" under the
" Republic Nat'l Bank ofN. Y, 815 F.2d at 235.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. Republic alleged that Eastern customarily loaded Republic's bags last so
that they would be the first bags off the plane. Id. at 239. Eastern argued, and
Baronti's testimony confirmed, however, that Republic, not Eastern suggested
that this procedure be performed. Id. at 239-40. Thus the Eastern employees did
not violate any Eastern rules relating to handling of high value luggage by loading
other bags after the currency. Id.
21 Id. at 235.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
21 Id. The Warsaw Convention provides the air carrier with limited liability in
most cases. In pertinent part the Convention provides that "[i]n the transportation of checked baggage and of goods the liability of the carrier shall be limited to
a sum of 250 francs per kilogram ..
" Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art.
22(2). Two hundred fifty francs per kilogram converts to approximately $9.07 per
pound. Republic Nat'l Bank of N.Y, 639 F. Supp. at 1418.
V, Republic Nat'l Bank of N.Y, 815 F.2d at 236. For the items that the Convention requires the air carrier to set forth on the baggage check see supra note 16.
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Warsaw Convention.2 7 The district court concluded that
the Warsaw Convention limited Eastern's liability, and
held that Eastern's maximum liability was $634.90.28 Republic appealed, arguing that the district court erred in
failing to require strict adherence to the baggage claim
check provisions of the Warsaw Convention and in failing
to find Eastern guilty of wilful misconduct in handling the
baggage. 29 Held, affirmed: Absent a showing of prejudice to
the passenger by the carrier's technical non-compliance
with the baggage claim check provisions of the Warsaw
Convention, or absent a demonstration of wilful misconduct related to the loss of checked baggage, an air carrier
is entitled to limited liability under the Warsaw Convention. Republic Nat 'I Bank of N. Y v. Eastern Airlines, 815 F.2d
232 (2d Cir. 1987).
I.
A.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

History of the Warsaw Convention

The history of the Warsaw Convention demonstrates
the dissatisfaction with the liability limitations that the
Convention imposes .30
The Warsaw Convention
27 Republic Nat'l Bank ofN. Y,
815 F.2d at 236. The Warsaw Convention prevents an air carrier from taking advantage of limited liability if the loss is due to
"wilful misconduct." The relevant portion of the Convention reads as follows:
The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of
this convention which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is
caused by his wilful misconduct or by such default on his part as, in
accordance with the law of the court to which the case is submitted,
is considered equivalent to wilful misconduct.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 25(1). There is some dispute as to what
constitutes wilful misconduct. See infra notes 193-213 and accompanying text for a
discussion of wilful misconduct under the Warsaw Convention.
2s Republic Nat'l Bank of N.Y, 639 F. Supp. at 1412. The district court calculated
Eastern's maximum liability based on 70 pounds of luggage, the maximum
amount of luggage allowed a passenger according to Eastern's tariff, at the rate of
$9.07 per pound, the equivalent of 250 francs per kilogram. Id. at 1418.
29 Republic Nat'l Bank of N.Y,
815 F.2d at 236.
so See generally Albert, Limitations on Air CarrierLiability: An Inadvertent Return to
Common Law Principes,48J. AIR L. & COM. 111 (1982); DeVivo, The Warsaw Convention: Judicial Tolling of the Death Knell?, 49J. AIR L. & COM. 71 (1983); Haskell, The
Warsaw System and the U.S. Constitution Revisited, 39 J. AIR L. & COM. 483 (1973);
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emerged from conferences in Paris and Warsaw convened
to discuss the legal problems of the then young aviation
industryAI The participants in the conference had two
goals. First, they sought to draft uniform rules governing
the rights and liabilities of international air carriers and
passengers and to adopt uniform documentation. 2 The
participants at the Convention believed that uniformity
was necessary to lessen the conflict of law problems which
could arise in litigation against air carriers. 3 Accordingly,
the Convention established standards for documentation
including tickets, waybills, and baggage claim checks. 4
The Convention also addressed certain procedural areas
including jurisdiction and statutes of limitation for actions
seeking to impose liability on air carriers. 5
Second, the participants sought to limit the potential liability of air carriers. 3 6 The participants recognized this
Johnson & Minch, The Warsaw Convention Before the Supreme Court: Preservingthe Integrity of the System, 52 J. AIR L. & CoM. 93 (1986); Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, The
United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497 (1967); Comment,
Aviation Law: Attempts to Circumvent the Limitations of Liability Imposed on Injured Passengers by the Warsaw Convention, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 851 (1978); Comment, The
Growth of American Judicial Hostility Towards the Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention, 48 J. AIR L. & CoM. 805 (1983) [hereinafter Comment,JudicialHostility];
Note, Interpretation of the Three Day Notice Requirement of Article 26(2) of the Warsaw
Convention, 39J. AIR L. & CoM. 251 (1973).

Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, supra note 30, at 498.
Id
"3 Id.; see also H. DRION, LIMITATION OF LIABILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW
41-42 (1954). Among the possible conflicts of law the Convention was designed
to avoid were conflicting jurisdictional determinations, conflicting statutes of limitations, conflicting documentation requirements, and conflicting substantive ele31
32

ments of claims. See 1 C. SHAWCROSS & K. BEAUMONT, AIR LAW VII/2 (4th ed.

1987). The Warsaw Convention addresses each of these issues. Id.
31 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, arts. 3, 4, 8.
35 Id. arts. 28, 29. Article 28 provides that actions under the Warsaw Convention are subject to the jurisdiction of courts where the carrier has his domicile or
principal place of business, where the contract was made, or at the destination. Id.
art. 28. Article 29 provides that the statute of limitations is two years from the
date of arrival or the date that the aircraft should have arrived or from the date the
transportation stopped. Id. art. 29
311 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 30, at 499.
The Convention set maximum liability for death or injury at 125,000 Poincar6 francs consisting of 65 /2
milligrams of gold at the standard of fineness of nine hundred thousandths. Liability for lost baggage or goods was set at 250 francs per kilogram. Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 22. At the time of the adoption of the Warsaw
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as the more important of the two goals because large tort
claims could destroy the industry, and fear of large claims
was preventing the industry from raising capital. 7
The Warsaw Convention granted air carriers limited liability but shifted the burden of proving lack of negligence
to the air carrier. 8 Given the difficulty of establishing the
elements of negligence in airline disasters,3 9 this provision essentially required the carrier to admit liability unless the carrier could invoke one of the two defenses
Convention, 125,000 Poincar6 francs were equal to approximately $5,000. 1 C.
SHAWCROSS & K. BEAUMONT, supra note 33, at VII/3. However, the value of the
dollar relative to gold declined, and in 1973 the United States devalued the dollar
against gold. As a result the Warsaw liability limitations increased to approximately $10,000 per passenger and $9.07 per pound for baggage. 39 Fed. Reg.
1526 (1974). The United States subsequently went off the gold standard, but continued to adhere to the 1973 gold valuation for purposes of converting Poincar6
francs to United States dollars under the Warsaw Convention. See 14 C.F.R.
§ 221.176 (1987). The United States Supreme Court approved the continued use
of the last official conversion rate in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint
Corp., 466 U.S. 243 (1984). According to the Court, tying recovery under the
Warsaw Convention to the market value of gold would defeat the Convention
framers' desire to establish predictable liability for carriers. Id. at 262.
37 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 30, at 499. Drion criticized this rationale, noting "it is of little sense to protect the industry at the expense of its
users. .... " H. DRION, supra note 33, at 18. Moreover, even if liability limitation
was arguably appropriate in 1929, once aviation grew past the start up phase, the
infant industry argument began to ring hollow. By the 1960's public sentiment in
the United States was that air carriers could and should bear the full burden of
their accidents, because the industry had grown enough to absorb the cost and
was safe enough that insurance was available at an inexpensive price. Lowenfeld,
The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 54 DEP'T ST. BULL. 580 (1966).
3 Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, arts. 17, 18, 19. The delegates saw this
shift as quid pro quo. Comment,JudicialHostility, supra note 30, at 808 n. 16. Article
17 provides that the carrier "shall be liable" for bodily injury or death. Warsaw
Convention, supra note 3, art. 17. Liability for damage or loss to checked baggage
is provided in Article 18. Id. art. 18. Article 19 provides liability for delays in
transportation of passengers, baggage, or goods. Id. art. 19.
39 W. PROSSER, TORTS 246-47 (5th ed. 1984). Essentially, the problem is that

the evidence needed to prove negligence is destroyed in the accident. Id. at 244.
In some instances the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor overcomes this problem. The
doctrine of res ipsa loquitor requires the plaintiff to demonstrate:
1. the event would not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence;
2. the defendant had exclusive control of the agency causing the event; and
3. the plaintiff did not contribute to the accident. In some early air carrier accidents, the plaintiff could not demonstrate that the accident was unlikely to occur
in the absence of negligence. Id. at 246.
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provided in the Convention. 40 A carrier could escape liability by: (1) establishing that the passenger was contributorily negligent 4 or (2) demonstrating that the carrier had
taken all measures necessary to avoid the accident or that
it was impossible for the carrier to take such measures.4 2
The Convention became effective in November 1932,
following ratification by France, Poland, Latvia, Spain,
Brazil, Yugoslavia, and Rumania.43 Although the United
States did not participate in drafting the Warsaw Convention, the United States Senate approved the Convention
by a voice vote without conducting prior committee hearings or debates on the floor.44 The United States adhered
to the Convention beginning in 1934. 45
International demands for revision of the Convention
began almost immediately.46 The dissatisfaction leading
to the demands for revision focused upon two perceived
problems. First, the language of Article 25, depriving a
carrier of limited liability when the damage or injury was
the result of wilful misconduct, was interpreted differently
from country to country and even by courts within the
same country.4 7 Second, some countries argued that the
liability limitations set by the Convention were unrealistically low, while others argued they were too high.48 The
Comment,Judicial Hostility, supra note 30, at 808.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 21.
42 Id. art. 20. The Montreal Agreement, see infra notes 62-65 and accompanying
text, eliminated this defense. In essence, after the elimination of this defense, the
carriers were held strictly liable. Comment,JudicialHostility, supra note 30, at 813.
-' Article 37 provided that the treaty would come into force ninety days after
five countries had ratified the Convention. Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art.
37. Spain deposited its ratification March 31, 1930. Brazil ratified the Convention May 2, 1931 and Yugoslavia ratified the Convention on May 27, 1931. Rumania ratified the Convention on July 8, 1931 and France, Latvia and Poland ratified
the Convention on November 15, 1932. The Warsaw Convention came into force
pursuant to Article 37 on February 13, 1933. 137 L.N.T.S. 13 n.2.
44 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 30, at 502.
4-,78 CONG. REC. 11,582 (1934).
46 Comment, Judicial Hostility, supra note 30, at 810.
41 See generally G. MILLER, LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT 193-223
40

41

(1977). See infra notes 193-213 and accompanying text for a discussion of U.S.
cases.
49 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 30, at 504. The proponents of higher
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result of this dissatisfaction was the Hague Conference in
September, 1955. 4 ' The Hague Conference led to an
amendment to the Warsaw Convention commonly known
as the Hague Protocol.5"
The Hague Conference addressed both the standard
for wilful misconduct and liability limitations. 51 Because
the wilful misconduct provisions provided a means of
avoiding the liability limitations of the Convention, the
participants at the Hague Conference believed that clarifying the wilful misconduct standard in favor of the carrier
was a necessary quidpro quo for increasing the liability limitations.52 Thus, two changes emerged from the Hague
Conference. First, a court could find a carrier guilty of
wilful misconduct only if "the damage resulted from an
act or omission of the carrier... done with intent to cause
damage or recklessly and with knowledge that damage
would probably result. ' ' 53 Second, the liability limitations
54
for death or personal injury were doubled to $16,000.
The United States never ratified the Hague Protocol due
to increasing opposition to tort liability limitations in airliability limits argued that developed countries generally awarded much higher
personal injury and wrongful death awards than the awards allowed under the
Warsaw Convention. The proponents of higher liability limitations favored requiring the air carrier rather than the victim to bear the loss in aviation accidents.
Id. On the other hand, some countries argued that liability limits were too high,
causing less developed countries to reject the Convention. Id.
49 Id. at 504-05.
50 Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, opened for signature Sept. 28, 1955, 478
U.N.T.S. 371 [hereinafter the Hague Protocol].
51Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 30, at 504.
52

Id. at 505.

Hague Protocol, supra note 50, art. XIII. The Warsaw Convention had not
specifically identified the state of mind necessary for wilful misconduct. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 25. The delegates had considered two possible
approaches to the revision of Article 25. The first proposal involved the articulation of the mental state required for wilful misconduct. The second proposal involved imposition of a higher monetary liability limitation for intentional acts than
for negligent acts. Lowenfeld & Mendlesohn, supra note 30, at 505.
- The Hague Protocol raised the liability limitations to 250,000 francs. Hague
Protocol, supra note 50, art. XI. This amount converted to $16,600 at the time the
Hague Protocol was being considered. Comment,Judicial Hostility, supra note 30,
at 811. The United States initially sought a $25,000 limitation. Comment, supra
note 3, at 957.
-3
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craft disasters. 55 The stage was thus set for United States'
denunciation of the Warsaw Convention.5 6
In 1965, the United States formally denounced the
Warsaw Convention, explaining that the denunciation was
due to dissatisfaction with the Convention's liability limits
for injury and death claims. 57 The State Department's announcement explained that the United States would retract its denunciation if all international air carriers
agreed to increase the Warsaw Convention's liability limitations for injury or death to $75,000.58 The major airlines of the world agreed to these demands.5 9 The result
,- See Comment, supra note 3, at 958. Andreas Lowenfeld explained some of
the opposition in his remarks to a special International Civil Aviation Organization meeting:
Our quarrel rather is with the other compromise contained in the
Warsaw Convention: the compromise between the interests of the
airlines and the interests of the traveling public.... [T]he overriding
issue in the Warsaw Convention, as we see it, is that it was entered
into in the late 1920's, when international aviation was hardly over
the experimental stage and when the primary need was a means to
prevent the growth of international aviation being choked off by one
or more catastrophic accidents. Today, in contrast international aviation is big business. We are over the experimental stage. We are
over the infant industry stage ....

[T]he hazards of flying have been

very much reduced and are actuarialy predictable.
For these reasons the United States believes that there is no
longer justification for a convention which tips the balance heavily in
favor of the industry and against the consumer.
Lowenfeld, supra note 37, at 580-82.
56 The Warsaw Convention provides that any party may denounce the Convention. Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 39. Denunciation becomes effective
six months after notification. Id.
.7
U.S. Gives Notice of Denunciationof Warsaw Convention, 53 DEP'T ST. BULL. 923
(1965). The Department of State's press release indicated that the denunciation
of the Warsaw Convention was "solely because of the convention's low limits of
liability for injury or death to passengers." Id. at 924.
.5

Id.

The agreement was signed by the airlines instead of the parties to the Warsaw Convention because the agreement is not technically an amendment to the
Warsaw Convention. Comment, JudicialHostility, supra note 30 at 813 n.54. Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention allows carriers and passengers to enter into
special contracts that provide for a higher limitation of liability. Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 22. However, the Convention renders "any provision tending to relieve the carrier of liability or to fix a lower limit . . . null and void."
Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 23. Airlines licensed after the Montreal
Agreement became effective are deemed to have signed the Montreal Agreement.
51

14 C.F.R. § 203.5 (1987).
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was the Montreal Agreement. 60
The Montreal Agreement changed the Warsaw Convention in two major ways. First, it increased maximum liability for injury and death to $75,000.61 Second, it
required airlines to waive the defenses contained in Arti63
cle 20.62 In effect, the airlines agreed to strict liability.
Because the airlines signed the Montreal Agreement, the
United States continued to adhere to the Warsaw
Convention .64

The signatories to the Montreal Agreement designed it
to be an interim measure until they could amend the Warsaw Convention.65 In 1971, the member nations met in
Guatemala for that purpose.6 6 The Guatemala Protocol
increased the Montreal Agreement limit for compensation
for death and injuries to $100,000.67

strict liability on the

airlines. 68

It also imposed

The United States, how-

60 Agreement C.A.B. 18,900, I.A.T.A. Agreement Re: Liability Limitations, 44
C.A.B. 819, reprinted in 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966) [hereinafter the Montreal
Agreement].
61 Id. The full text of the agreement is reprinted in 2 C. SHAWCROSS & K. BEAUMONT, supra note 33, at D43-D50. The Montreal Agreement applies to all flights
that include the United States as a point of origin, point of destination, or agreed
stopping place. Id. at D43.
62 Agreement C.A.B. 18,900, I.A.T.A. Agreement Re: Liability Limitations, 44
C.A.B. 819, 819 (1966). The Warsaw Convention allowed carriers to avoid liability when they had done everything they could to avoid the accident. Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 20.
63 Carriers may still claim contributory negligence of the passenger as a defense. Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 21.
- U.S. to ContinueAdherence to Warsaw Convention, 54 DEP'T ST. BULL. 955, 955-57
(1966).
- Id. at 956. The Department of State press release indicated: "This is an interim arrangement terminable on 12 months' notice. In the months ahead public
hearings will be held for the purpose of determining the definitive United States
position in preparation for further international discussions concerning the Warsaw Convention." Id.

6,

1 C. SHAWCROSS & K. BEAUMONT, supra note 33, at VII/14.

Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, openedfor signature March 8, 1971, 10 I.L.M.
613 [hereinafter the Guatemala Protocol]; see InternationalCivil Aviation Organization: Protocol Revising Warsaw Convention Rules on Air CarrierLiability to Passengers, 10
I.L.M. 613 (1971). The Guatemala Protocol provided for maximum liability of
67

1,500,000 francs. Each franc was deemed to consist of 65 I/2 milligrams of gold.

Id. art. VIII. This amounted to $100,000. Comment, supra note 3, at 989.
66 Guatemala Protocol, supra note 67, art. V.
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ever, never ratified the Guatemala Protocol and thus it
never became effective.69
In 1975 the International Civil Aviation Organization
met to amend the Warsaw Convention and the Hague
Protocol once more. 70 The group drafted several amendments known as the Montreal Protocols. 7' The Montreal
Protocols provided for measurement of liability by Special
Drawing Rights, an international monetary unit.72 In
1983, the United States Senate defeated the Montreal
Protocols,73 marking the third time in less than thirty
years that the United States refused to ratify limitations of
liability.74 The Warsaw Convention and Montreal Agreements, with their lower liability limitations, are both still
in effect in the United States. Thus, the courts of the
United States are left to enforce the Warsaw Convention
69 The provisions of the Guatemala Protocol required thirty nations to ratify the
agreement. Under the terms of the Guatemala Protocol five of these thirty nations must account for at least 40% of scheduled air traffic. Since the United
States alone accounts for 40% of scheduled air traffic, the Guatemala Protocol
essentially cannot become effective without U.S. ratification. Guatemala Protocol,
supra note 67, art. XX.
71, Comment, supra note 3, at 990. The text of the Montreal Protocols is set
forth in 2 S. ROSENFELD, BOOKLET 19, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AvIATION 66-81 (1984) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol No. 1, No. 2, No.
3, and No. 4 or collectively the Montreal Protocols].
71 See DeVivo, supra note 30, at 72-75 for a more detailed discussion of the provisions of the Montreal Protocols.
72 The Montreal Protocols were designed to create a substitute for the Poincar6
franc as the basis of measurement of liability. The Montreal Protocols are complicated by the fact that different versions of the Warsaw system are in effect in different countries. The Warsaw Convention, the Hague Protocol and the
Guatemala Protocol each have different liability limitations. Montreal Protocol
No. 1, thus applies to countries which have accepted the Warsaw Convention.
Montreal Protocols, supra note 70, art. I. Montreal Protocol No. 2 applies to
countries which have accepted the Hague Protocol. Montreal Protocol No. 2,
supra note 70, art. I. Montreal Protocol No. 3 applies to countries which have
accepted the Guatemala Protocol. Montreal Protocol No. 3, supra note 70, art. I.
The fourth Montreal Protocol simplifies air waybill documentation requirements.
Montreal Protocol No. 4, supra note 70, art. III.
7. 129 CONG. REC. S2270-79 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1983).
74 Some critics of limited liability believe that no air carrier liability limitation
measure will ever be ratified by the United States Senate. "When any one or anything ... attempts to impose an arbitrary or artificial limitation of any kind . ..
there is going to be a clash of ideology. And I do not think in this day and age you
will see any further ratification of limitations." Kreindler, supra note 3, at 529-31.
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despite the unpopularity of the basic concept of liability
limitation.
B. Judicial Interpretation of the Warsaw Convention
A court wishing to disregard the liability limitations of
the Warsaw Convention, without expressly disclaiming
the validity of the Convention, can do so by finding that
the carrier has not met the documentation requirements
which are prerequisites for limited liability7 5 or by finding
that the carrier engaged in wilful misconduct.7 6 Many
cases lend themselves to either approach.
1. Documentation Requirements
The Warsaw Convention established requirements for
three types of documents commonly provided by air carriers: passenger tickets, baggage checks, and air waybills."
The information required on each document is quite similar. Thus, courts developed the law in each area by way of
analogy to the other areas.
71 See infra notes 77-192 and accompanying text for a discussion of the documentation requirements of the Warsaw Convention.
76 See infra notes 193-213 and accompanying text for a discussion of wilful
misconduct.
77 Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, arts. 3, 4, 8. For the text of Article 3 covering passenger tickets, see supra note 9. For the text of Article 4 covering baggage claim checks see supra note 16. In pertinent part the text of Article 8 reads:
The air waybill shall contain the following particulars: (a) The place
and date of its execution; (b) The place of departure and of destination; (c) The agreed stopping places, provided that the carrier may
reserve the right to alter the stopping places in case of necessity, and
that if he exercises that right the alteration shall not have the effect
of depriving the transportation of its international character; (d) The
name and address of the consignor; (e) The name and address of the
first carrier; (f) The name and address of the first consignee, if the
case so requires; (g) The nature of the goods; (h) The number of
packages, the method of packing, and the particular marks or numbers upon them; (i) The weight, the quantity, the volume or dimen-

sions of the goods; . . . (q) A statement that the transportation is

subject to the rules relating to liability established by this
Convention.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 8. Article 9 provides that if the air waybill
does not contain items (a) through (i) the carrier may not invoke limited liability.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 9.
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a. Passenger Tickets
The Warsaw Convention requires the air carrier to give
each passenger a ticket containing certain information
about the flight, including points of departure and destination, agreed stopping places, and a statement about the
applicability of the Warsaw Convention. 78 Failure to deliver a ticket results in loss of limited liability. 79 Among
the earliest cases to construe these provisions was Ross v.
Pan American Airways.80 In Ross, the plaintiff was part of a
USO group scheduled to fly to Europe to entertain American soldiers. 8 ' A USO official made all travel arrangements for the group 2 All of the tickets for the group
were delivered to that official. The plaintiff never actually
received a ticket.8 3 The court held that the agent had implied authority to receive the ticket by virtue of his role in
arranging the transportation.8 4 Because the agent had authority to receive the ticket, delivery to the agent was
binding on the plaintiff.8 5 Thus, the court limited the air
carrier's liability despite the fact that the plaintiff never
saw the ticket.86
In another early case, Grey v. American Airlines, 7 the
court granted the carrier limited liability even though the
carrier had expressly failed to refer to the agreed stopping
places in the ticket.8 8 In Grey, the plaintiff's decedents
79

Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 3(1).

7,.Id. art.

3(2). Article 3 does not specifically require the presence on the ticket
of the items listed in Article 3(1). The Convention merely provides that the air
carrier must deliver a ticket. Several courts, however, have held that the inclusion
of the required items is part of delivery. See infra notes 94-125 and accompanying
text.
8"190 Misc. 974, 77 N.Y.S.2d 257 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 274 A.D. 767, 80
N.Y.S.2d 735 (1948), aft'd, 299 N.Y. 88, 85 N.E.2d 880 (1949).
81Id. at 974, 77 N.Y.S.2d at 259.
82 Id.
83 Id.

Id.
.1Id. The court noted that "[tihe Convention does not require that physical
delivery be made to the passenger in person." Id.
84

-6

Id.

227 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 989 (1956).
mmId. at 284. While the inclusion of agreed stopping places is not an express
condition for limited liability, several courts have interpreted the requirements set
87
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were en route from New York to Mexico City when the
defendant's plane crashed at Love Field in Dallas, Texas.
Dallas had not been listed as a stopping place on the
ticket. 89 The court found that the omission of the stopping place was "technical and wholly unsubstantial." 90
For that reason the court concluded that the carrier
should be allowed to claim limited liability. 91 The Grey
case began a trend. Before Grey, courts looked only at the
requirements of the Warsaw Convention to determine
whether limited liability should be granted. After Grey
courts began to consider whether the purposes of the
Warsaw Convention were served by limiting liability. 92 As
a result of Grey, courts began to reject a strict construction
of the Convention in favor of a looser, purpose oriented
approach.93
Later courts used this technique to prevent the carrier
from limiting its liability in situations where the carrier arguably met the Warsaw Convention requirements. In
Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc. ,9 the passenger, an Army
officer accompanying a shipment of material to Japan,
died in an airplane accident in Japan. 95 The passenger
did not receive his ticket until after he had boarded the
plane which was ready to take off.96 The statement on the
forth in Article 3 to constitute part of delivery. See infra notes 94-125 and accompanying text.
H9Grey, 227 F.2d at 284.
w) Id. The labeling of Warsaw Convention requirements as technical and insubstantial has been especially popular in cargo cases because it allows a court to
require the waybill to contain only those items which are commercially necessary.
See infra notes 170-192 and accompanying text.
9,Grey, 227 F.2d at 284.
92 The Grey Court analyzed the purpose of the Warsaw Convention as a whole:
The scheme of the Warsaw Convention is pretty plain on its face....
...But perhaps of greater significance is the general purpose of
protecting international air carriers from the burden of excessive
claims connected with the loss of aircraft under circumstances which
make it impossible, or virtually so, to determine the mechanical or
human shortcomings which caused the disaster.
Id. at 285.
- See infra notes 94-192 for a discussion of this trend.
1,4 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965).
- Id. at 853.
Id. at 857.
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ticket concerning limitation of liability was printed in such
a way that it was illegible and almost unnoticeable. 7 The
court held that in these circumstances the carrier had not
adequately delivered the ticket. 98 In reaching this holding, the court analyzed the purpose of the delivery requirement. The court concluded that the Convention
required delivery of a ticket containing notification of the
applicability of the Warsaw Convention was to give the
passenger an opportunity to take measures to protect
himself from the airline's limited liability. 99 Delivery of
the ticket just prior to take off could not accomplish this
purpose.100 The Mertens court claimed that its decision
did not conflict with Ross, characterizing the Ross holding
as a statement of the principle that the Warsaw Convention does not require that the passenger expressly assent
to the liability limitation.' 0 '
The court in Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc. 102 engaged
in a similar analysis. In Warren, an aircraft operated by
Flying Tiger disappeared while flying to Vietnam.'
The
plane was carrying ninety-six passengers. Ninety-two
were United States soldiers. 0 4 The representatives of the
soldiers brought the suit.' 0 5 The plaintiffs argued that
Flying Tiger failed to deliver the passenger tickets adequately because Flying Tiger issued the tickets to the
soldiers as they boarded the airplane. 0 6 The tickets did
37

Id.

)8 Id.

99 Id. But cf Ross, 190 Misc. at 974, 77 N.Y.S.2d at 259. The Ross court held that
the plaintiff need not receive a ticket. Delivery to the plaintiff's agent was sufficient. Thus, although the plaintiff did not have notice of the limitation of liability,
the court held limited liability appropriate. Id. at 974, 77 N.Y.S.2d at 259.
-o Mertens, 341 F.2d at 857. The court noted that even if the officer had read
the ticket and decided to buy extra insurance, he could not do so because he was
under military orders to remain on the plane. Id.
- Id. "[Ross] did not decide whether the ticket must be delivered in such a
maner [sic] as to provide the passenger with a reasonable opportunity to take selfprotective measures." Id.
102

352 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1965).

I,Id. at 495.
10,4 Id.
1o5 Id.
i,Id.at 496.
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contain a notice of applicability of the Warsaw Convention. 0 7 The trial court found, however, that the notice
was in such fine print that the passenger would need a
magnifying glass to read it.' 08 The tickets did not contain
the passengers' names or the agreed stopping places.109
The court stated that it was in "complete accord" with the
Mertens analysis of the purpose for the delivery requirement."10 The air carrier did not give the passengers an
opportunity to take self-protective measures."' The
court pointed out that if the carrier had delivered the tickets earlier, for instance in the hour while the passengers
waited to board the plane, the passengers could have
purchased additional life insurance from insurance vending machines located in the terminal."12 Based on both
Warren and Mertens, the Warsaw Convention requirement
of delivery became a requirement of delivery prior to the
flight.
The decision in Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane"3 further liberalized the Convention requirements in favor of
passengers. In Lisi, prior to the flight, the passengers received a ticket containing a notice of the applicability of
the Warsaw Convention.' " 4 That notice, however, was in
very fine print and was positioned so that it was almost
unnoticeable.' ' 5 The court held that the printing did not
provide 'adequate notice to the passenger because the
107

Id. at 497.

108

Id.

109Id.

The Warsaw Convention requires both of these omitted items; however,
their absence does not necessarily entitle the passenger to claim unlimited liability. See supra note 79.
1,o Warren, 352 F.2d at 498.
11 Id. The court pointed out that the passengers could not be blamed for the
loss of the right to take protective measures because they had arrived in plenty of
time to read any notice given to them. Id.
112 Id.
"'. 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd per curiam, 390 U.S. 455 (1967) (4-4
decision).
I" at 513.
Id.
11-1Id. at 514. A copy of the ticket is included in the district court's opinion.
Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, 253 F. Supp. 237, 242 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 370
F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd, 390 U.S. 455 (1967).
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print was too small." 16 Thus, the passenger could not take
protective measures. While the court did not require actual notice, the Lisi holding was a step in that direction.
In dicta the Lisi court went further. The court pointed out
that even if the printing had been legible, the notice
would still be inadequate because it was difficult to understand."17 Thus, although under the facts set out in Lisi the
passengers had ample time to discover the liability limitation, read the notice, have the notice explained to them,
and procure additional insurance, the court found the notice inadequate. The dissent characterized the Lisi holding as tantamount to requiring actual notice and charged
that the court's liberal interpretation 8 of the Convention
amounted to judicial treaty making." 1
One year later in Egan v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.,119 the
Court of Appeals of New York explicitly stated that a literal reading of the Convention was inappropriate under
the facts presented.1 20 In Egan, the court faced a situation
1- Lisi, 370 F.2d at 514. The court decided that the notification was too small as
a matter of law. Id. Although it seems that the visibility of a warning would be a
classic jury issue, the parties chose to treat the issue as one that the court could
objectively determine. Id. at 513 n.9.
,,7 Id. at 514 n.10. The court believed that the failure to define "international
carriage" and the value of "French gold francs (consisting of 65 1/2 milligrams of
gold with a fineness of nine hundred thousands)" was unnecessarily confusing.
For a contrary conclusion on virtually the same issue see Parker v. Pan Am. World
Airways, 447 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969). For a discussion of Parker see
infra notes 141-143 and accompanying text.
118The dissent severely criticized the majority, stating that "[t]he majority do
not approve of the terms of the treaty and, therefore, by judicial fiat they rewrite
it. They think a 'one sided advantage' is being taken of the passenger which must
be offset by a judicial requirement that the passenger have notice of the limitation
of liability." Lisi, 370 F.2d at 515.
,is, 21 N.Y.2d 160, 234 N.E.2d 199, 287 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 1039 (1968).
12o Id. at 160, 234 N.E.2d at 203, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 20. The printing on the ticket
was 4 1/2 point type. Id at 160, 234 N.E.2d at 200, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 16. The
court rejected the defendant's argument that Ross dictated that the carrier's liability should be limited, pointing out that conditions had changed since the date of
the Ross decision. The court justified departing from a strict interpretation of the
Warsaw Convention because "a traveler today is likely to undertake international
travel quite casually and without realizing the drastically limited protection he is
receiving when compared to that provided by domestic flights." Id. at 160, 234
N.E.2d at 204, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 21.
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similar to Lisi. The air carrier physically delivered a ticket
12
to the passenger, but the print was difficult to read.
The court held that although according to the letter of the
Convention such a notice was adequate, according to the
spirit of the Convention, fine print did not satisfy the no22
tice requirement.
The court declared that national policy required that
"air carriers give passengers clear and conspicuous no23
tice" of the applicability of the Warsaw Convention.1
Relying on a passage from Eck v. United Arab Airlines,124 a
Warsaw Convention case interpreting the venue provisions of the Convention, the court explicitly stated that
although a literal reading of the Convention might have
been appropriate at the time the Convention was
adopted, changes in the nature of air travel required that
courts adhere to the purpose, rather than the letter, of the
Convention. 25 In essence, the court was arguing not for
a generally liberal interpretation of the Warsaw Convention, but rather for either a strict or liberal interpretation
of the Convention, as the facts of the case required, to
give effect to the underlying purpose of the Convention.
Id. at 160, 234 N.E,2d at 200, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 16.
Id. at 160, 234 N.E.2d at 203, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 20.
123 Id. at 160, 234 N.E.2d at 204, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 21.
The court gleaned this
national policy from previous decisions and CAB regulations. Id. The court did
not consider the possibility that an international policy favoring uniform standards of liability might outweigh national policy.
124 360 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1966).
The Eck court indicated:
A court faced with this problem of interpretation, or another like it,
can well begin with an inquiry into the purpose of the provision that
requires interpretation. The language of the provision that is to be
interpreted is, of course, highly relevant to this inquiry but it should
never become a "verbal prison." (Citations omitted).... The inquiry
may lead the court to conclude... that when the words were first
chosen the language accurately reflected the provision's purpose but
that today the same words imperfectly reflect this purpose because
conditions have changed in the area to which the words of the provisions refer.
Id. at 812. The court noted that these interpretation principles were especially
relevant to treaties because treaties are less likely to be regularly modified than
statutes. Id. at 812 n.18.
2.
Egan, 21 N.Y.2d at 160, 234 N.E.2d at 203, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 20.
121
122
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Baggage Checks

In many ways the Warsaw Convention provisions related to baggage checks are quite similar to the provisions
related to passenger tickets. Article 4 of the Warsaw Convention requires that the carrier provide a baggage check
which lists, among other items, the number and weight of
the packages and a statement that the transportation is
subject to the Warsaw Convention. 26 Failure to include
2 7
any of these items results in the loss of limited liability.
Seth v. British Overseas Airways Corp.,128 was one of the
earliest significant cases under Article 4. The plaintiff, a
citizen of India, received an award to study theology in
Cambridge, Massachusetts. 29 As part of the award, he received two airline tickets to Massachusetts. 30 The plaintiff checked two bags containing valuable religious
treatises.' 3' The carrier lost the bags. The plaintiff contended he was entitled to full reimbursement because the
statement on the baggage claim check regarding the applicability of the Warsaw Convention liability limitations
was unclear. 32 The court disagreed. While the ticket did
not categorically inform the passenger that his transportation was subject to the Warsaw Convention, the court
concluded that it gave the passenger adequate notice that
liability limitations existed, which the carrier would take
advantage of if it could. 3 3 The warning thus achieved the
primary objective of the notice requirement: assuring that
a passenger is aware that he may require extra insurance
coverage.'34 Mere technical noncompliance with the WarSee supra note 16 for the relevant text of Article 4.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 4(4).
"2A329 F.2d 302 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 858 (1964).
"1
27

121)

-,'

Id. at 304.
Id.

'"t Id. at 305. There was some question as to whether the treatises were overvalued to manufacture the requisite jurisdictional amount. However, the court
could not conclude that it was impossible for Seth to recover more than the jurisdictional amount, assuming the Warsaw limitations did not apply. Id.
'' Id. at 306-07.
1.- Id. at 307.
144 Id.
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saw Convention was not sufficient to impose unlimited liability if the purpose of the Warsaw Convention was
achieved. However, where the purpose of the Warsaw
Convention was not achieved, mere technical compliance
was insufficient to obtain limited liability.
Stolk v. Compagnie Nationale Air France,135 reiterated this
notion. In Stolk, the plaintiff lost two pieces of luggage on
an Air France trip from New York to Paris. The required
statement of liability limitation for loss of baggage was
printed both on the ticket and the baggage check. 136 The
court held that although the carrier had issued the ticket
and baggage check approximately two weeks in advance,
the plaintiff did not have notice of the limitations of the
Warsaw Convention because the type was too small to
read. 3 7 Although the ticket contained a warning in ten
point type relating to the applicability of limitations of liability for death or bodily injury, the court determined that
this warning did not achieve the primary purpose of the
Convention because it would not put a passenger on no138
tice that similar limitations applied to checked baggage.
Both Seth and Stolk demonstrate that courts hearing
ticket and baggage claim cases place heavy emphasis on
whether the passenger had notice of the Warsaw Convention and whether the passenger could understand the notice. The question naturally arises whether illegibility is a
question of law or fact. Several cases seem to suggest that
39
the judge determines whether the warning is adequate.
-5 58 Misc. 2d 1008, 299 N.Y.S.2d 58 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1969), aft'd, 64 Misc. 2d
859, 316 N.Y.S.2d 445 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970).
- Id. at 1008, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 60.
'.-1 Id. The court analogized the situation to Lisi and Egan. Id. at 1008, 299
N.Y.S.2d at 60-61. The court noted it would be "incongruous to permit a notice
such as was denounced in Lisi v. Alitalia and Egan v. Kollsman ...under Art. 3 to
satisfy the more rigid requirements of Art. 4." Id. at 1008, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 61.
The court pointed out that the notice was a judicially imposed condition of delivery under Article 3 but was mandated by the Convention under Article 4. Id.
Id. at 1008, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 62.
See, e.g., Lisi, 370 F.2d at 514 (notice "camouflaged in Lilliputian print in a
thicket of'Conditions of Contract' "); Warren, 352 F.2d at 497 (fine print on ticket
would be difficult to read without a magnifying glass); Mertens, 341 F.2d at 857
(statement printed "in such manner as to virtually be both unnoticeable and un-
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Assuming the purpose of the notice requirement is to
warn passengers that they may require additional insurance, it would seem, however, that the passenger's subjective interpretation of the notice should be the 140
appropriate
standard for judging adequacy of the notice.
4
The court in Parker v. Pan American World Airways 1 1
made it clear that it is the plaintiff who must be unable to
read or comprehend the warning rather than a third
party. 142 The carrier need not demonstrate that the passenger had actual knowledge of the applicability of the
Convention; rather, the passenger must demonstrate that
if he looked for the notice, he would have been unable to
read or comprehend the notice. 4 This is a reasonable requirement, assuming that the purpose of the notice requirement is to allow the passenger to assess whether he
needed extra protection.
Most courts now take a relatively uniform approach to
the Warsaw Convention's notice requirements, allowing a
carrier to retain limited liability as long as the underlying
44
purposes of the Warsaw Convention are fulfilled.1
Courts do not yet, however, agree what effect to give to
other failures to comply with the Warsaw Convention.
readable"). But see Trans World Airlines v. Christophel, 500 S.W.2d 409,410 (Ky.
1973) (holding a warning twice the size of the print on the rest of the ticket
adequate).
140 See supra notes 94-125 and accompanying text for a discussion of various
courts' interpretations of the purpose of the Warsaw Convention.
14 447 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
142 Id. at 736.
,4.Id. The court concluded that although an airline employee had difficulty
reading and understanding the ticket, this fact was of no significance because
there was no evidence plaintiff's vision was similarly defective. Id.
,4See supra notes 128-138 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases concerning the purposes of notices regarding baggage liability limitations. Courts
also generally agree on the effect of a carrier's failure to deliver a baggage check
altogether. See, e.g., Baker v. Lansdell Protective Agency, 590 F. Supp. 165
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (loss ofjewelry during security screening; carrier not required to
issue claim check because carrier had not taken control of the baggage); Hexter v.
Air France, 563 F. Supp. 932 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (carry-on bag given to attendant on
board airplane; airline had accepted bag without baggage claim thus liability unlimited); Schedlmayer v. Trans Int'l Airlines, 99 Misc. 2d 478, 416 N.Y.S.2d 461
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1979) (carry-on bag given to attendant; claimant could not retrieve
bag, thus airline had accepted bag without baggage claim and liability unlimited).
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For instance, the Warsaw Convention requires that the air
carrier record the number and weight of checked bags on
the baggage claim check.145 In cases in which the carrier
did not fulfill this requirement, the courts in Maghsoudi v.
Pan American World Airways,' 46 Hill v. Eastern Airways,' 47 and
Kupferman v. Pakistan InternationalAirlines' 48 all concluded
that liability was unlimited in accordance with the literal
language of the Warsaw Convention. In each case, the
carrier failed to record the weight of the passenger's baggage. Both the Hill and the Kupferman courts decided the
issue in summary fashion. 149 The defendant had failed to
record the weight, and thus he was not entitled to limited
liability according to the plain language of the
Convention.
The Maghsoudi court gave the issue greater attention.
The court ultimately adopted an approach of strict construction of the Convention against the party primarily
benefited by the Convention. The court explained its rationale in detail. It expressly rejected the airline's argument that the weight of the luggage was irrelevant to the
operation of the Convention. 5 0 The court concluded that
the weight of the luggage was highly relevant in the passenger's decision whether to buy additional insurance, because the passenger would have to know the recorded
weight to determine the carrier's maximum liability for
See supra note 16 for text of Article 4.
470 F. Supp. 1275 (D. Haw. 1979). The plaintiff was traveling to Iran to
make records from two master tape recordings which he had packed in the lost
luggage. Id. at 1276. The plaintiff claimed that the entire trip was worthless because the luggage disappeared. Id. at 1276-77.
,47 103 Misc. 2d 306, 425 N.Y.S.2d 715 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1981). The plaintiff lost
three separate pieces of baggage on a trip to Acapulco. One bag disappeared on
the trip to Acapulco and the other two disappeared on the flight home. Id.
148 108 Misc. 2d 485, 438 N.Y.S.2d 189 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1981). The airline misplaced the plaintiffs' luggage and as a result the plaintiffs did not have suitable
clothing to participate in all of the activities included in their package tour to
China. Id. at 485, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 190-91.
W,Hill, 103 Misc. 2d at 306, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 716; Kupferman, 108 Misc. 2d at
485, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 192.
,-o Maghsoudi, 470 F. Supp. at 1279. The airline argued that the plaintiff could
easily have estimated the maximum liability by approximating the weight of the
bag. Id.
14.

14r
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51
loss of the luggage under the Warsaw Convention.1
52
The court in Martin v. Pan American World Airways'
adopted a similar approach but reached a different result
in essentially the same situation. The plaintiff in Martin
checked a number of bags prior to her departure for Buenos Aires. 153 The baggage handler placed two tags on one
bag and failed to tag another bag. In addition, the handler did not record the weight of any of the bags. 154 The
plaintiff argued that because of these failures to comply
with the Warsaw Convention, Pan Am should be subject
to unlimited liability. The court disagreed, rejecting
a lit55
eral interpretation of the Warsaw Convention.
The Martin court rejected the Maghsoudi court's interpretation of the purpose of Article 4.156 Looking to the
legislative history of the Convention, the Martin court
stated that the primary purpose of the Convention was to
limit the liability of air carriers by limiting the recovery
57
available for personal injuries and loss of property.
While recognizing that improvements in the airline industry's methods of operation and financial prospects had decreased the need for such provisions, the court noted that
the liability limitations were still intact. 5 8 The court de-

, The court noted that estimated liability could vary greatly depending upon
the weight used as an estimate. Id. The court also distinguished the line of cases
departing from a strict construction of the Convention, claiming that the Lisi, Warren, and Mertens plaintiffs had presented a compelling reason for departing from a
strict construction of the Warsaw Convention. Id. at 1279 n.10. The court decided Pan American World Airways had not done so in the instant case. Id.
,52 563 F. Supp. 135 (D.D.C. 1983).
,53 Id. at 136. The plaintiff said she noted that the bags were mistagged and
that she told the baggage handler about his mistake. The baggage handler did
not check into the situation further. Id. at 137.
154

-55

Id.
Id. at 139.

,5""
The Maghsoudi court concluded that allowing the passenger to determine
whether extra insurance coverage is necessary is a primary purpose of the Warsaw
Convention's weight requirement. Maghsoudi, 470 F. Supp. at 1279.
17
Martin, 563 F. Supp. at 139. The court noted: "The primary purpose of the
Warsaw Convention is to limit the potential liability of international air carriers.
This was accomplished by establishing limits on the amounts to which an airline
would be liable for personal injury and property loss." Id. (Citation omitted).
'5" Id.; see also H. DRION, supra note 33, at 16 (criticizing liability limitation as a
means of achieving financial stability).
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termined that absent Congressional action to change the
Convention, it must construe the Convention to carry out
its purpose. 159 The court concluded that although the
Warsaw Convention required the carrier to note the
weight of the luggage, the purpose of the Warsaw Convention was best served by overlooking this omission be1 60
cause the omission was technical and insubstantial.
The plaintiff could calculate the airline's maximum liability by estimating the weight of her luggage and extending
this weight at $9.07 per pound.' 6 ' Having failed to make
this mental calculation to determine whether she needed
to protect herself against the potential loss in excess of
1 62
the carrier's liability, she bore the risk of excess loss.
In Gill v. Lufthansa German Airlines, t6 3 the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York disagreed with the Martin court's approach to Article 4. Gill
involved a somewhat different factual setting than Martin.
The airline required the plaintiff, Dr. Gill, to give up his
159Martin, 563 F. Supp. at 139. The court considered both sides of the liability
limitation argument.
Several courts have applied the language of the Convention under
facts analogous to those at issue here and have found that an airline
failing to weigh a passenger's luggage may not claim limited liability
under the Convention.
However this court does not find this authority, which bases its holding on a literal reading of the record keeping provisions of the Convention, controlling under the facts before it ...
Although improvements in baggage handling security and in the airline's competitive posture have eroded [the need for limited liability]
to some extent, the limited liability provisions of the Convention remain intact. The court must follow the fundamental principle that a
treaty, whether construed strictly or liberally, must be interpreted to
effectuate its evident purpose.
Id. (Citations omitted).
Id. at 140.
161 Id.
1;12 Id. at 140-41.
As authority for the proposition that a court may ignore a
technical and insubstantial omission which does not prejudice the passenger, the
Martin court cited Grey, 227 F.2d at 284. "In Grey, the airline had failed to make
specific reference on the passenger ticket to the intermediate 'agreed stopping
places' of the flight .... The court of appeals found ... that the record keeping
requirement embodied in that article was a technical and minor one .. " Martin,
563 F. Supp. at 141 n.7.
-, 620 F. Supp. 1453 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
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carry-on bag as he entered the airplane. 64 The airline
never gave the plaintiff a baggage claim check or indicated
in any way that the bag was checked.' 65 When the bag
disappeared, the airline claimed limited liability. The
court refused to limit the carrier's liability. 166
The court distinguished Martin on the facts, pointing
out that the Gill plaintiff had not voluntarily checked his
luggage, and, thus, he had no opportunity to determine
whether he required additional insurance. 67 Limiting the
carrier's liability would defeat the purpose of the Warsaw
Convention. 68 On a more fundamental level, the court
objected to the end result in Martin. Noting that the Convention shifted a great deal of responsibility and risk to
the passenger, the court held that it was not overly technical to demand literal compliance with 69the minimal requirements of the Warsaw Convention.
c.

Air Waybills

While most recent decisions relating to both personal
injury and loss of luggage show great concern for equitable compensation of the plaintiff despite the limitations of
the Warsaw Convention, 70 decisions relating to air
freight seldom show a similar concern. This is probably
due to a judicial perception that commercial shippers
164
Id. at 1454. The bag contained business documents. Gill claimed that the
delay in finding the lost bag prevented consummation of a business deal. Id.
-. 5 Id.
...
Id. at 1456.
167 Id. Apparently, Gill's flight was delayed while he and the attendant argued
over whether he should have to check the bag. Id. Thus once the bag was taken
from Gill there was no time at all to purchase extra insurance.
....
Id. The court determined that the fact that Gill had previously been given a
claim check with the appropriate warnings for another piece of luggage was of no
significance. Although arguably the first claim check warned Gill that the Convention applied, that claim check did not contain the weight of the second piece of
luggage. The first claim check thus did not satisfy the Warsaw Convention requirements as to the second piece of luggage. Id. at 1455.
-!,
Id. at 1456. "The language [of the Convention] should be given its plain
meaning and effect. Article 4 is straightforward ....[I]t is not unreasonable or
overly technical to require the carrier to comply with the minimum requirements
plainly set out by the Convention." Id.
,71See supra notes 92-169 and accompanying text.
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need less protection against limited liability than the traveling public. Accordingly, courts tend to construe the
provisions of Article 8 and Article 9 to limit the liability of
the air carrier. 171
The earliest of these cases arose shortly after the Ross
decision, which held that the carrier was entitled to limited liability for personal injuries despite the fact that the
plaintiff was unaware of the Warsaw Convention. 72 The
court in Kraus v. Koninkljke Luchtvaart Maatschappi3,
N. V ,'173 applied a similarly strict standard to the shipment
74
of cargo. In Kraus, the plaintiff shipped a rare book.
The book never reached its destination. The plaintiff
sought to recover $3,650, the value of the book, while the
defendant asserted that its liability was limited to the dollar equivalent of two hundred and fifty francs. 175 The
plaintiff argued that the liability limitation should not apply since the waybill did not contain a statement of agreed
stopping places. 1 76 The court looked to the purpose of
the requirement and determined that the requirement was
designed to enable a shipper to determine whether the
Warsaw Convention applied to the flight. 77 Because the
airline incorporated its published timetable by reference
and the international nature of the flight was indicated by
the places of departure and destination, the 7court
deter8
appropriate.
was
liability
limited
that
mined
Almost without exception, courts considering Article 8
of the Warsaw Convention have followed the Kraus example and have attempted to determine whether the purpose
of the Warsaw Convention was fulfilled even absent strict
compliance with the terms of the Convention. 79 Thus,
171
172
173

See infra notes 173-192 and accompanying text.
Ross, 190 Misc. at 974, 77 N.Y.S.2d at 259.
92 N.Y.S.2d 315 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949), aff'd, 278 A.D. 811, 105 N.Y.S.2d 351

(1951).
174

Id. at 316.

175

Id.

176

Id. at 317.

177

Id.

17H
'79

Id.
British courts have also looked to the purpose of the Article 8 provisions
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arguments which would be successful in a personal injury
case are often rejected in cargo cases. The classic example of the rejection of an Article 3 doctrine is Bianchi v.
United Air Lines.' 80 In Bianchi, the plaintiff shipped a promissory note to Mexico.' 8 ' Because the note was necessary
for a real estate transaction, it was essential that the note
be delivered promptly. 82 The note was delayed and in
the interim the peso was devalued causing the plaintiff a
83
$10,000 loss.

The plaintiff argued that the size of the

notice of applicability of the Warsaw Convention made
the warning virtually unreadable. 84 The plaintiff cited
Lisi in support of the argument. The court found it unnecessary to consider whether the Lisi rationale should be
applicable to a commercial setting, and held that as a matter of law the warning was adequate. 85
In Exim Industries v. Pan American World Airways, 186 the
Second Circuit elaborated on the significance of the commercial setting to the applicability of the Warsaw Convention. Exim Industries made two shipments of Indian silk
blouses from India to New York. 8 7 The market value of
the blouses exceeded $80,000; however, the district court
l
limited recovery to $8,740. 8'
The heart of Exim's argument on appeal was that the waybills Pan Am provided
they have applied. See, e.g., Corocraft Ltd. v. Pan Am. Airways, [1969] 1 Q.B. 616,
654 (omission of dimension of package; Warsaw Convention should be interpreted so as to make "good sense amongst commercial men."); Samuel Montagu
& Co. v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., [1966] 2 Q.B. 306, 310 (lack of definite statement
of applicability of Warsaw Convention; interpretation should not hamper conduct
of business). But see Westminster Bank v. Imperial Airways, [1936] 2 All E.R. 890,
897 (rejecting argument that waybill is a commercial document which should be
construed liberally and in a commercial sense).
22 Wash. App. 81, 587 P.2d 632 (1978).
Id. at 81, 587 P.2d at 632-33.
182

18.,

Id. at 81, 587 P.2d at 633.
Id.

Id. at 81, 587 P.2d at 634.
1- Id. at 81, 587 P.2d at 635. The court pointed out that the warning was
printed "in bold face, easily legible type placed directly above the space wherein
[the plaintiff's agent] affixed his signature." Id.
184

18o 754 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1985).

Id. at 107.
1.8 Id.
187
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did not comply with the Warsaw Convention. The first
waybill did not indicate the method of packing or the distinctive marks on the package. 8 The second waybill did
not state the volume or dimensions of the cargo.190 The
court determined that these omissions were "technical
and insubstantial" because the required items had little or
no commercial significance and their omission did not
prejudice the shipper.' 9 ' The court concluded that despite the explicit requirements of the Warsaw Convention, the only items necessary on the waybill were those
the shipment or deterthat were significant in identifying
92
rate.
freight
the
mining
Wilful Misconduct

2.

In addition to imposing unlimited liability for failure to
comply with certain documentary requirements, the Warsaw Convention provides that the carrier may not avail itself of limited liability if the plaintiff's loss was caused by
wilful misconduct. 9 3 The definition of wilful misconduct
has never been clear and case law concerning the subject
has done little to decrease the confusion. Nevertheless,
plaintiffs often assert wilful misconduct in conjunction
with claims that the carrier did not heed the Warsaw Convention's documentation requirements.
Grey v. American Airlines 194 provided one of the earliest
instances in which a plaintiff argued that the carrier had
not complied with the Warsaw Convention and that the
carrier had engaged in wilful misconduct. The court apat 108.
Id.
it" Id. The court emphasized throughout the opinion that Exim was a commercial shipper. Id. at 106-09.
192 Id. at 108. The court similarly rejected Exim's contention that the notice of
the applicability of the Warsaw Convention was inadequate because the carrier
had said the Convention "may be" applicable. Id. The court stated: "[W]e believe the framers' intent was that the shipper be given reasonable notice of the
likelihood that the Convention would be applicable, not that the carrier be treated
as didactic arbiter of the law." Id.
"', Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 25.
227 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 989 (1956).
189 Id.
190
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proved jury instructions which stated that proof of wilful
misconduct required- the defendant to exhibit "a conscious intent to do or omit doing an act from which harm
results to another ... [and that] there must be a realization of the probability of injury from the conduct, and a
disregard of the probable consequences of such conduct."'' 95 The court indicated that evaluation of the con96
duct was a jury question.
In practical terms, most recent decisions have interpreted Grey as establishing two requirements: first, that
the defendant's actions actually caused the loss and second, that the defendant was aware that his conduct could
cause a loss. Thus, for instance, storage of valuable
freight in a guarded area which had been robbed only
once in the previous year did not constitute wilful misconduct because the carrier did not cause the armed robbery
of the freight storage area. 97 Similarly, a New York court
ruled that an airline was not guilty of wilful misconduct
when an employee stole luggage, because the employee
was acting outside of the scope of employment. 98
On the other hand, courts have been less reluctant to
impose liability for wilful misconduct when an employee
acting within the scope of his employment commits the
complained of act.t99 Even in these instances, however,
wilful misconduct is difficult to establish. The plaintiff
must demonstrate that the employee knew of the special
circumstances that could lead to the loss, realized that
there was a probability of loss because of these circumstances, and disregarded the probable consequences of
15 Id. at 285.

286.
Hang Bank v. Japan Air Lines Co., 357 F. Supp. 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
The plaintiff had shipped $250,000 in bank notes with the airline declaring no
value so that the cheapest freight rate would apply. Upon arrival, the airline
placed the notes in a locked storage area which was monitored by closed circuit
television for safekeeping until the plaintiff picked them up. Id.
198Rymanowski v. Pan Am. World Airways, 70 A.D.2d 738, 416 N.Y.S.2d 1018
(1979), aft'd, 49 N.Y.2d 834, 404 N.E.2d 1336, 427 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1980).
-1 See infra notes 201-213 and accompanying text for a discussion of wilful misconduct by airlines employees.
196Id.at
197Wing
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the act. °0
The court in Cohen v. Varig Airlines 201 applied this test
and determined that the carrier was guilty of wilful misconduct. 2 In Cohen, the plaintiffs' flight, which was
scheduled to terminate in Rio de Janeiro, ended in Sao
Paulo instead.20 3 Representatives of the airline scheduled
the plaintiffs on a connecting flight to Rio de Janeiro. 0 4
The plaintiffs expressed concern that their luggage might
not be on the new flight. However, the representative assured the plaintiffs that he would personally see that the
luggage was loaded. He later said that he had actually
seen the luggage on the plane.20 5 When the plaintiffs arrived in Rio, an airline employee told them that the flight
continued to New York. Because the plaintiffs did not
want to go to New York, an airline employee drove them
to the terminal, where the plaintiffs waited for their luggage. 20 6 The luggage never arrived. Assuming that their
luggage was destined for New York, the plaintiffs demanded that the airline remove their luggage from the
plane bound for New York. 7 The airline representatives
refused and told the plaintiffs they could get their luggage
in two days when the plane returned from New York.20 8
The luggage disappeared, compelling the plaintiffs to
wear their travel clothes for eighteen days on an Amazon
Cohen v. Varig Airlines, 62 A.D.2d 324, 405 N.Y.S.2d 44, 47 (1978).
Id.
202 Id. at 324, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 48.
203 Id. at 324, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 45. The plaintiffs were taking a 28 day tour of the
Amazon. They had been scheduled to fly from Iguassu Falls to Rio de Janeiro.
After the plane took off they learned, however, that their plane was being routed
to Sao Paulo. Id.
204 Id.
205 Id.
20C Id. The plaintiffs were on a flight from Sao Paulo to New York with a stop in
Rio de Janeiro. In Rio the airline chose to switch planes. The airline told the
passengers that they would have to board another aircraft to New York. Apparently, the airline loaded all of the luggage from the first plane onto the second
plane and drove the passengers to the second plane. The plaintiffs protested that
they did not want to go to New York and stayed on the bus. Id.
207 Id. at 324, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 46.
208 Id. The airline employee told the plaintiffs that it "would not go to the expense of unloading the plane" for them. Id.
200
201
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20 9

The court found Varig guilty of wilful misconduct.21 0
The court held that because the plaintiffs had informed
the carrier of their inability to wait for the return of their
luggage, the defendant had knowledge of the probability
of lOSS. 2 11 At that point the defendant had a choice of
either delivering the luggage and incurring the expense of
unloading the plane or requiring the plaintiffs to suffer
the loss. The defendant made a business judgment to require the plaintiffs to suffer the loss. The defendant knew
that the plaintiffs would be inconvenienced but nonetheless failed to perform its contractual duty to the plaintiffs. 2 12 The facts in Cohen were somewhat unusual.
Luggage generally disappears due to less egregious conduct. For instance, in most cases mere negligence in the
handling of luggage does not rise to the level of wilful
misconduct; rather, the carrier must be aware of the risk
he is creating and proceed despite that risk.21 3
II.

REPUBLIC NATIONAL BANK OF NEW YORK
V. EASTERN AIRLINES

Republic National Bank of New York v. Eastern Airlines2" 4
addressed both the issue of non-compliance with the documentary requirements of Article 4 of the Warsaw Convention and the wilful misconduct provisions of the
Convention. While Republic's loss arose during the
course of transportation of checked baggage, even the
,, Id. at 324, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 45-46.
Id. at 324, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 55.
211 Id. at 324, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 48.
2

210

212

Id.

Maschinenfabrik Kern A.G. v. Northwest Airlines, 562 F. Supp. 232, 240
(N.D. Ill. 1983). Kern claimed that Northwest had accepted several duplicating
machines for shipment knowing that the machines were poorly packaged. Id. at
240. The court set out the standard for wilful misconduct: "[W]ilful misconduct
occurs where an act or omission is taken with knowledge that the act probably will
result in injury or damage or with reckless disregard of the probable consequences." Id. The court refused summary judgment on the issue of liability, finding that the parties raised an issue of fact. Id.
214 815 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1987).
21-
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most well-heeled traveler is unlikely to carry several million dollars in his checked luggage. Thus, Republic did not
fit the mold of other Article 4 cases.
The court initially noted that the baggage check issued
to the courier did not set out the passenger ticket number,
the number and weight of packages, or a statement related to the applicability of the Warsaw Convention liability limitation rules.2 t5 The court further noted that the
express language of the Convention precluded limited liability when those items were absent.21 6 The Second Circuit, however, recognized that the contents of the
baggage were atypical. For this reason the court followed
the logic of the cargo decisions rather than the checked
baggage decisions.217
The court began its analysis with a review of the Exim
case. The court noted that in Exim the air waybills lacked
particulars regarding the number of packages, the method
of packing, and the dimensions of the packages, all of
which Article 8 required, yet the Exim court had still allowed the carrier to limit its liability due
to the commer218
cial insignificance of the omitted items.
The court noted the many similarities between Article 4
and Article 8, recognizing that both Article 4 and Article 8
require information relating to notice, identification, and
weight.21 9 On this basis the court concluded that when
Id. at 237.
Id. at 236-37. For the text of article 4, see supra note 16.
27 Republic Nat'l Bank of N. Y., 815 F.2d at 237. The court characterized Republic as "more like a commercial shipper than the typical airline passenger." Id.
218 Id. The court described the circumstances in Exim as follows:
Missing from the air waybills in Exim were the method of packing,
the numbers on the packages and a properly worded notice of the
Convention's applicability. Because we found that these omissions
were technical and non-prejudicial under the facts of that case, however, and because the shipper had received adequate notice of the
Convention's applicability, we held that limited liability was available
to the carrier.
Id. For a discussion of the Exim case, see supra notes 186-192 and accompanying
text.
-l1t Republic Nat'l Bank of N. Y., 815 F.2d at 237. The court characterized Article
4 and Article 8 as parallels. The court noted three ways in which the requirements
of Article 4 and Article 8 are similar. First, both require the same basic informa2 15
26
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the traveler is more like a shipper than an ordinary passenger, the court should apply the Exim standard to disputes relating to the extent of liability rather than the
more liberal and passenger oriented Article 4 standard.220
After reaching the conclusion that the Exim standard
was applicable, the court analyzed the facts in terms of
Exim. Essentially, Exim excuses non-compliance with the
Warsaw Convention when the defendant's failure to comply with the documentation provisions of the Warsaw
Convention is technical and insubstantial and when the
failure to meet the documentation requirements does not
prejudice the plaintiff.2 2 ' The court concluded Eastern
had negotiated both hurdles.222
The court determined that the failure to include a notice of the Warsaw Convention's applicability on the Peru
baggage claim was non-prejudicial because both the ticket
and the Santiago baggage check included such a notice.223
Further, as an experienced courier, Baronti should have
been aware of the Convention's liability limitations.224
Thus, Republic could not claim lack of knowledge of the
Convention. 2
The court next explored the effect of Eastern's failure
to record the weight of the bag. The court used essentially the same approach the Martin court had used four
years earlier. The Martin court looked to the purpose of
tion (i.e. notice, identification and weight). Second, both apply to property that is
lost or damaged and neither affects liability for bodily harm. Finally, both articles
contain certain requirements that must be met to claim limited liability. Id.
220 Id.
221 Id.
222

Id. at 238.

22.1

Id. at 237.

224

Id.

Id. In this respect the Republic court's analysis is somewhat similar to the Gill
analysis. The Gill court was willing to concede that the previously issued baggage
claim check satisfied the notice requirements of the Warsaw Convention. Gill, 620
F. Supp. at 1456. However, unlike the Gill court, the Republic court determined
that the carrier need not note the weight of the baggage when the passenger
should have known that he would need insurance for the contents. Republic Nat '
Bank of N. Y., 815 F.2d at 238. For a discussion of Gill, see supra notes 163-169 and
accompanying text.
22-5
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the requirement that the weight of the bag be contained
on the baggage claim check.2 2 6 According to the Martin
court, the purpose of this requirement was to enable the
passenger to make a mental calculation to determine
whether he should purchase additional insurance.227 The
Republic court agreed that this was the purpose of the requirement and noted that it was obvious that Republic
would realize that it needed insurance to obtain adequate
coverage. The bag would have had to weigh in excess of
220,500 pounds for Republic to recover two million dollars at $9.07 per pound.2 2 8
The court found the absence of a baggage identification
number more troubling.2 29 Again the court looked to the
purpose of the requirement and determined that it was
designed to allow the passenger to recover his luggage at
his destination. 230 Eastern's failure to include any identification number frustrated this purpose. The court, however, was willing to excuse the deviation in view of the
special circumstances of the case. Baronti never actually
presented the bag for tagging, thus Eastern had no opportunity to ensure that the bag was properly tagged."'
The court further reasoned that Baronti's supervision of
the loading process assured that Eastern did not mishandle the bag as a result of the failure to include an identifying number on the bag.232 In essence the court applied a
proximate causation test requiring that the air carrier's
Martin, 563 F. Supp. at 139.
See supra notes 152-155 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Martin
analysis.
228 Republic Nat'l Bank of N.Y,
815 F.2d at 237-38.
226
227

229

Id. at 238.

Id.
Id.
232 Id. The court began its discussion of the lack of identification by once again
looking at the purpose of the identification requirement. "Obviously the purpose
of the baggage identification number is to assure the proper recovery of a passenger's baggage at the point of destination." Id. at 238. The court was willing to
forego this purpose, however, because Baronti had not presented the bag for tagging and because Baronti had supervised the loading. Neither of these factors,
however, eliminates or even decreases the likelihood that a bag will be given to
the wrong passenger at the ultimate destination.
230

231
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failure to comply with the mandatory provisions of the
Warsaw Convention be the direct cause of the plaintiff's
loss before the court would impose unlimited liability.
Having chosen to overlook the carrier's failure to comply with the baggage claim check provisions, the court
turned to the plaintiff's allegations of wilful misconduct.
The court concluded that Republic could avoid summary
judgment on this issue only by showing that the method
Eastern used to load the baggage was likely to result in
loss. 2 33 Republic claimed three acts of wilful misconduct:
violation of Eastern's tariff prohibiting shipment of currency as checked baggage, failure to adopt security procedures for loading high value baggage, and violation of
Eastern's defacto procedures for handling Republic's baggage. 234 The court disposed of each of these claims
quickly.
The court noted that the airline's violation of its tariff
by accepting currency as checked baggage did not in itself
create a probability that the baggage would be lost. 235 Republic failed to introduce evidence that accepting currency was likely to result in the loss and that Eastern was
aware of this likelihood.23 6 Thus, Republic's first claim
failed.
In response to Republic's contention that Eastern was
guilty of wilful misconduct because it failed to adopt high
value baggage procedures, the court pointed out that
Eastern did have high value cargo procedures. 7 These
23. Id. at 239 (citing Grey, 227 F.2d at 285).
The court noted that on this item
Republic bore the burden of proof. Republic Nat'l Bank of N. Y, 815 F.2d at 239. In
contrast, under most other provisions of the Warsaw Convention the plaintiff's
burden of proof is decreased. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the burden of proof under the Warsaw Convention.
254 Republic Nat'l Bank of N.Y,
815 F.2d at 239-240.
23.5 Id. at 239. The court noted that "other factors must be established indicating that such a loss is likely to occur and that the defendant was aware of the
probability when it accepted the plaintiff's valuables." Id.
236 Id.
237 Id.
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extra security measures were available for a fee, 238 but Republic chose not to take advantage of these services. 9
The court's refusal to accept Republic's argument was
correct. Eastern had no obligation to single Republic out
for better treatment than the average customer who chose
not to pay the fee. The choice not to pay was entirely
Eastern's. The court quoted the district court with approval noting, "if anyone was guilty
of wilful misconduct
24 0
it was Republic, and not Eastern.
Finally, the court dealt with Republic's claim that loading additional luggage after Republic's bags were on the
plane constituted wilful misconduct. The court noted that
Republic suggested the last on, first off process. 24 1 For
that reason, the court rejected Republic's claim that Eastern failed to comply with a de facto security measure
adopted to ensure safe transportation of the currency. 42
In sum, Republic had not demonstrated that Eastern's
failure to comply with the last on, first off procedure created any appreciable risk of loss.
Republic raised one last argument on appeal.243 Republic argued that regardless of whether Eastern had
adopted procedures to deal with valuable cargo in general, or Republic's currency shipment specifically, Eastern's failure to place the bag containing the currency near
the cargo door constituted wilful misconduct because it
proximately caused Republic's loss. 244 In response to this
argument, the court first noted that reversal on grounds
not raised below would be inappropriate. 4 5 The court
then noted that Baronti had known of the placement of
the bag and failed to take any corrective action.
The
The Warsaw Convention provides for the payment of a fee for excess declared value. Warsaw Convention, supra note 3,22(2).
238

2s9
240

24
242
243
244
245
246

Republic Nat'l Bank of N.Y, 815 F.2d at 239.

Id. (citing Republic Nat'l Bank of N.Y, 639 F. Supp. at 1418).
Republic Nat'l Bank of N. Y,815 F.2d at 239.
Id. at 239-40.
Id. at 240.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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court believed that Baronti's supervision of the process
negated any claim that Eastern
acted in reckless disregard
2 47
of the possibility of theft.
III.

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF REPUBLIC NATIONAL
BANK OF NEW YORK V. EASTERN AIRLINES

The Second Circuit's decision in Republic National Bank
of New York v. Eastern Airlines could prove to be a set back
for the traveling public. The result in Republic would not
have been surprising in a commercial air shipping situation under Article 8 because courts in those cases have
tended to construe the provisions of the Warsaw Convention to achieve the underlying purpose of limited liability
to the benefit of the carrier. However, in cases falling
under Articles 3 and 4, the passenger related articles,
courts have tended to construe the Convention to avoid
passenger loss. 24 8

While the Second Circuit intimated

that it might have viewed the case differently if an ordinary passenger had been involved, a very real danger exists that an airline might invoke the Republic holding
against a passenger. The Republic court expressly limited
its holding to those cases in which the passenger resembles a commercial shipper more than an ordinary passenger. However, an airline could easily argue that a
sophisticated traveler should be aware of the Warsaw requirements just as a commercial shipper should be aware
of the Warsaw Convention requirements.
In effect the Republic court unilaterally altered a United
States treaty. 249 The Warsaw Convention's requirements
are specific and compliance with the requirements is generally not a burden to the carrier, yet the Republic decision
labels the requirements insubstantial unless failure to
Id.
See supra notes 78-169 and accompanying text.
241 The Lisi dissent made a similar argument.
The dissent criticized the majority for engaging in judicial treaty making and suggested that although the Warsaw
Convention might be outdated, the executive and legislative branches rather than
the judicial branch should set out to solve the problem. Lisi, 370 F.2d at 515.
247
248
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meet the requirements is the proximate cause of the plaintiff's loss. The Warsaw Convention does not contain a
proximate causation provision. While not the first court
to declare certain mandatory provisions of the Convention insubstantial, the Republic court was the first to require, in effect, that the omission of the mandatory item
be the proximate cause of a passenger's loss as opposed
to a shipper's loss.
The Warsaw Convention attempted to accomplish two
objectives: the standardization of documents and the limitation of air carriers' tort liability. The Republic decision
and its predecessors virtually eliminate the mandated
standardized documents. A carrier can now retain limited
liability as long as it can demonstrate that the documents
issued included all the significant items which the Convention mandates. Courts evaluate the significance of the
omitted items on a case by case basis.250 Thus, courts
have replaced a clear cut standard for the evaluation of
entitlement to limited liability with a malleable standard.
While flexibility in the law is not necessarily undesirable,
where the framers of the law sought predictability of result, continual stretching defeats the aim of the law.
While it would be easy to speculate about the dire consequences which might occur as the result of the Republic
decision, only time will determine its ultimate significance. Of course the decision could be cited as abandoning the technical requirements of the system of
limited liability for air carriers. On the other hand, courts
250 See, e.g., Republic Nat ' Bank of N. Y,
815 F.2d at 237-38 (weight, identification
number, and statement of applicability of Warsaw Convention not relevant when
bank shipped large amounts of money as checked baggage); Exim, 754 F.2d at 108
(method of packing, volume, and dimensions of cargo not commercially significant); Seth, 329 F.2d at 307 (improperly worded warning of applicability of Warsaw Convention sufficient to warn passenger that carrier's liability would be
limited); Grey, 227 F.2d at 284 (omission of stopping place on ticket "technical
and wholly unsubstantial"); Martin, 563 F. Supp. at 140 (omission of weight of
passenger's luggage technical and insubstantial); Maghsoudi, 470 F. Supp. at 1279
(omission of weight of passenger's luggage highly relevant); Stolk, 299 N.Y.S.2d at
62 (warning of applicability of Warsaw Convention printed in fine print insufficient to warn passenger of carrier's limited liability).
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could recognize the uniqueness of the fact setting in
which Republic arose. Whatever the ultimate effect of the
Republic decision, it is one more case in a long line of cases
which have interpreted the Warsaw Convention in a manner necessary to achieve the outcome the court finds equitable. Of course, this approach often leads to conflicting
decisions because the court must decide first who should
win and then how it will interpret the Convention to
achieve that outcome.
Underlying the modern courts' tendency to twist the
Warsaw Convention to achieve equitable results seems to
be a genuine dissatisfaction with the Warsaw Convention.
Whether the airline industry still needs the limited liability the Warsaw Convention provides at the expense of injured passengers is questionable. On the other hand,
limitation of liability to commercial shippers does not
seem inequitable, because commercial shippers are better
prepared than passengers to assess the degree of risk they
are assuming and take appropriate measures to control
the risk.
The executive and legislative branches have paid little
attention to the Warsaw Convention in the past twenty
years. Therefore, the judicial branch not surprisingly has
felt constrained to step into the picture to attempt to
make an outdated treaty workable. Predictably, the result
has been a hodgepodge of often conflicting decisions.
Courts do not agree whether they should interpret the
Convention broadly or narrowly. Rather, courts seem to
select a desired result and construe the Convention in
whatever way is required to achieve that result. While this
technique may produce equitable outcomes, *it does violence to the notion of uniform international standards.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Republic National Bank of New York v. Eastern Airlines involved an unusual situation: the loss of baggage containing several million dollars. Given the fact that the value of
the contents of the baggage was so high, that the owner of
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the baggage was a bank, and that an employee of the bank
played a key role in supervising the handling of the baggage, the court's decision to excuse compliance with the
technical requirements of the Warsaw Convention was a
predictable outcome. The court's decision was no doubt
based upon the principle that business entities who deal
as equals should be aware of the risks inherent in the
transactions they negotiate.
Because the Republic decision was predicated, at least in
part, on equal bargaining power, applying the holding of
Republic to ordinary airline passengers or even to sophisticated passengers with high value luggage would not make
sense. The airline occupies a substantially stronger bargaining position than the passenger. Thus, although an
airline could plausibly argue that the items required by
the Warsaw Convention are no more significant to a passenger than to a commercial shipper, such an argument
should not be accepted. The requirements the Warsaw
Convention imposes serve to equalize the passenger and
the airline.
Although under the facts of the case the Republic court
may have reached a perfectly predictable and reasonable
decision, the court ignored the explicit requirements of
the Warsaw Convention. The court substituted its judgment for the judgment of the drafters of the Convention
regarding which items are significant on a baggage claim
check. While the court's decision might have been better
reasoned than the Warsaw Convention drafter's decision,
it was not a decision the court was entitled to make.
The Warsaw Convention was designed to achieve uniformity in international aviation tort law. One of the
means of achieving this uniformity was the adoption of
uniform documents so that carriers would be aware exactly what was required if they wanted to claim limited liability. Obviously, if courts second guess the Warsaw
Convention drafters, uniformity evaporates.
While the time may have arrived for the United States
to abandon the Warsaw Convention, courts should not
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dictate abandonment by judicial fiat. Congress has
greater latitude to examine a broad spectrum of issues in
considering the best resolution of the liability limitation
problem.
Whatever the ultimate decision on the wisdom of liability limitation, the time has come for the United States to
evaluate the desirability of continued adherence to the
Warsaw Convention. In the developed nations aviation is
a flourishing industry. In these nations airlines could easily bear a greater portion of the expense of their accidents. While some of the aims of the Warsaw Convention
are laudable, in many respects the Convention is outdated. The United States should take the lead in considering strategies to promote uniform and equitable
standards for the liability of international air carriers.
BarbaraA. Bell

TORTS - FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT - The discretionary function exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act
shields the United States from tort liability for the Federal
Aviation Administration's negligent denial of a pilot's
medical certificate. Heller v. United States, 803 F.2d 1558
(11 th Cir. 1986), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, 808 F.2d
1524 (1987).
Richard W. Heller began his career as a commercial pilot in 1956 and became a captain in 1958.' Federal Aviation Regulations ("FARs") required Heller, as a captain,
to complete a first-class physical examination every six
months.2 In the following years, Heller underwent regular medical check-ups, which in 1968 included an electrocardiographic examination ("EKG").5 Injanuary of 1972,
Heller experienced chest discomfort and entered a hospital for testing.4 The examining physician, Dr. Teng, diagnosed that Heller suffered a myocardial infarction.5 He
based this diagnosis on the results of an EKG performed
upon Heller's admittance to the hospital. 6 Heller thereupon instructed Dr. Teng to notify the Federal Aviation
Administration (the "FAA") of Heller's condition and to
provide them with a medical report.
I Brief for Appellant at 4, Heller v. United States, 803 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir.
1986) (No. 85-3847)[hereinafter Appellant's Brief].
2 Id.
Id.
4 Id. at 5.
Heller v. United States, 803 F.2d 1558, 1561 (11th Cir. 1986). A myocardial

infarction results from the complete obstruction of one or more of the blood vessels feeding the heart's tissue. Id. at n.4. When the vessel shuts down, the tissue

dies due to lack of continued oxygenation. Id. The resultant heart damage depends upon the size and location of the blocked vessel and the area of tissue involved. Id.
6 Appellant's Brief, supra note 1, at 5.
7 Heller, 803 F.2d at 1561.
14 C.F.R. § 61.53 (1987) provides that:

No person may act as pilot in command, or in any other capacity as a
required pilot flight crewmember while he has a known medical defi-
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The FAA withdrew Heller's first-class medical certificate, meaning he could no longer work as a commercial
airline pilot. 8 However, it failed to compare Dr. Teng's
findings with Heller's FAA medical records which included the 1968 EKG. 9 Such comparison would have revealed that the suspect characteristics of the 1972 EKG
also existed in the 1968 EKG.' In other words, Heller's
condition exhibited no change." Without such a change,
Heller argued, the diagnosis of myocardial infarction
12
should not have been made.
Heller applied for recertification twice, and he petitioned on three occasions for an exemption from the certification requirements.' 3 Yet, all attempts to regain his
medical certificate proved futile.' 4 Heller thereupon
sought help from Dr. Richard Masters, the medical coordinator for the Air Line Pilots Association.' 5 After further
testing of Heller by cardiac specialists, Dr. Masters petitioned the FAA, on Heller's behalf, for an exemption
from the applicable FARs. 16 On April 22, 1980, the Federal Air Surgeon found Heller qualified for a first-class
airman medical certificate and therefore issued such a cerciency... that would make him unable to meet the requirements for

his current medical certificate.
Id.
Heller, 803 F.2d at 1561. 14 C.F.R. § 67.25(a) (1987) provides that:
The authority of the Administrator... to issue or deny medical certificates is delegated to the Federal Air Surgeon, to the extent neces-

$

sary to .

..

[i]ssue, renew, or deny medical certificates to applicants

and holders based upon compliance or noncompliance with applicable medical standards.
Id.
Appellant's Brief, supra note 1, at 5.
Appellant's Brief, supra note 1, at 6.
Id.
12 Id.
1. Heller, 803 F.2d at 1561. The Federal Aviation Act provides that "[t]he Secretary of Transportation from time to time may grant exemptions from the requirements of any rule or regulation prescribed under this subchapter if he finds
that such action would be in the public interest." 49 U.S.C. app. § 1421 (1982).
Heller, 803 F.2d at 1561.

14

Appellant's Brief, supra note 1, at 7.
I"Id.
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tificate to him. 7
In July of 1982, Heller filed a complaint under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA")tI in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, seeking
damages for the FAA's negligent denial of his airman certificate.' 9 The United States moved for and received a dismissal on the ground that the district court lacked subject
21
matter jurisdiction 20 due to governmental immunity.
Held, affirmed: The discretionary function exception of the
Federal Tort Claims Act shields the United States from
tort liability for the Federal Aviation Administration's
negligent denial of a pilot's medical certificate. Heller v.
17 Heller, 803 F.2d at 1561.
Federal law requires that "[i]f the Secretary of
Transportation finds, after investigation, that such person possesses proper qualifications for, and is physically able to perform the duties pertaining to, the position for which the airman certificate is sought, he shall issue such certificate....
49 U.S.C. app. § 1422(b) (1982).
8s 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b) (1982). The FTCA allows damage suits against the

United States:
for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by
the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred.
Id. The Act provides that the liability of the United States for tort claims shall be
"in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances... " Id. § 2674.
-o Heller v. United States, 620 F. Supp. 270 (M.D. Fla. 1985).
20 Id.; FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Rule 12(b) provides that:
[e]very defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading
• . . shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is
required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the
pleader be made by motion: (1) lack ofjurisdiction over the subject
matter....
Id.
21 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982). Section 2680(a) includes the discretionary function exception which provides that the FTCA shall not apply to:
[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or
regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or
based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionaryfunction or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of
the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
Id. (emphasis added).
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United States, 803 F.2d 1558 (11 th Cir. 1986) reh'g and reh'g
en banc denied, 808 F.2d 1524 (1987).
I.

A.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946

The Federal Tort Claims Act represents a limited
waiver of the federal government's sovereign immunity.2 2
The Act's underlying policy implies that if citizens at large
benefit from a government program, that collective citizenry, not the individual injured by the negligent conduct
of the program, should bear the economic burden of that
injury.2 3 Under the statute, civil litigants may hold the
federal government liable for damages for any claim that
predicates private liability under similar circumstances.24
An exception to the FTCA provides immunity from tort
action when a federal agency or employee performs or
fails to perform a discretionary function. 25 Three predominant policies justify the discretionary function exception. 26 First, it promotes the separation of powers by
sparing federal officials from explaining their official actions in court. 27 Second, in areas of policy-making, courts
are not equipped to investigate and weigh the factors
2
The Federal Tort Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 79-601, §§ 401-424, 60 Stat. 842
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401-2402,

2411-2412, 2671-2680 (1976)); see W. WRIGHT, THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT 2

(1957). Prior to the enactment of the FTCA, the United States and its agents
committed a number of actionable wrongs if the U.S. were an individual or corporation. Id. at 2. A system developed to compensate injured parties through private congressional bills of relief. Id. at 2-5. They were "not a matter of right but a
matter of grace." Id. at 2; see, e.g., W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN,
PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 131 (5th ed. 1984); Borchard, Governmental Respon-

sibility in Tort, VI, 36 YALE L.J. 1 (1926); Parker, The King Does No Wrong - Liability
for Misadministration, 5 VAND. L. REV. 167 (1952).

2.1 Allen v. United States, 816 F.2d 1417, 1424 (10th Cir. 1987) (nearly 1,000
persons sued under the FTCA for injuries allegedly sustained as a result of the
government's open-air testing of nuclear weapons at a Nevada test-site from
1951-1962).
14 See supra note 18 for the text of the relevant sections of the FTCA.
2
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982); see supra note 21 for text.
21i See Reynolds, The DiscretionaryFunctionException of the FederalTort Claims Act, 57
GEO. L.J. 81, 121-23 (1968).
27 Id. at 121.
Note, however, that the court does not consider the personal lia-
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which enter into the decisions of the other branches.28
Last, the exception prevents the enormous and unpredictable cost that could result from judicial re-examination of
government decisions. 29 In sum, the discretionary function exception has defeated liability claims when officials
exercise policy-making authority30 but not when the
claims involve operational level negligence . 3 Defining
the boundary between operational level and policy level
actions presents a difficult duty for the court.
B.

The FederalAviation Act

The goal of the Federal Aviation Act is to promote
safety in air commerce.32 To achieve this goal, Congress
empowered the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration to issue or deny airman certificates. 3 The
Administrator delegates statutory authority pertaining to
medical certification to the Federal Air Surgeon. 4 In
bility of the official because the United States is the defendant in all FTCA cases.

Id.

I2 Id. at 122.
Id.
so Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
213

-1 Id. The Supreme Court recognized a distinction between planning level and
operational level acts as early as Johnston v. District of Columbia, 118 U.S. 19
(1886). In Johnston, the Court found that a municipal authority's decision to adopt
a general plan of drainage and determination of where to build the sewers was
discretionary, because such decision involved eonsiderations of public health. Id.
at 20-21. However, the negligent construction and repair of sewers were actionable. Id. at 21; see also Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62, 75
(D.C. Cir. 1955) (per curiam) (construing air traffic controller negligence as
operational).
32 49 U.S.C. app. § 1421(a)(1982). Section 1421 provides that, "[t]he Secretary
of Transportation is empowered and it shall be his duty to promote safety of flight
of civil aircraft in air commerce ..
" Id.; see, e.g., Meik v. NTSB, 710 F.2d 584,
586 (9th Cir. 1983) (FAA properly denied medical certificate to a pilot who had
suffered moderate cerebrovascular accident); Dodson v. NTSB, 644 F.2d 647, 651
(7th Cir. 1981) (FAA properly denied medical certificate to a pilot with evidence
of coronary disease); Day v. NTSB, 414 F.2d 950, 953 (5th Cir. 1969) (statute to
promote safety of flight on civil aircraft in air commerce provided adequate standards to support the regulation).
".1 49 U.S.C. app. § 1422(a) (1982). Section 1422(a) provides that, "[t]he Secretary of Transportation is empowered to issue airman certificates specifying the
capacity in which the holders thereof are authorized to serve as airmen in connection with aircraft." Id.
-14 14 C.F.R. § 67.25(a) (1987); see supra note 8.
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most cases, the applicant for a medical certificate begins
the process with an examination by a private physician
designated by the Air Surgeon to serve as an aviation
medical examiner ("AME"). 5
Regulations provide that, in order for an individual to
lawfully serve as a pilot of a civil aircraft of United States
registry, the individual must hold a pilot certificate 36 and
an appropriate medical certificate. 3 7 Both the type of pilot certificate and the class of medical certificate required
depend upon the type of flying in which the pilot wishes
to engage. To serve as a pilot-in-command, Heller required an airline transport pilot certificate3 8 and a firstclass airman medical certificate which is subject to renewal
every six months.3 9 To maintain this level of medical approval, pilots-in-command over thirty-five must show an
absence of myocardial infarction on an EKG.40
35 14 C.F.R. § 67.23 (1987). Section 67.23 provides that "[a]ny aviation medical examiner who is specifically designated for the purpose may give the examination for the first class certificate." Id.
36 14 C.F.R. § 61.3(a) (1987). Section 61.3(a) provides that "[n]o person may
act as pilot in command or in any other capacity as a required pilot flight
crewmember of a civil aircraft of United States registry unless he has in his personal possession a current pilot certificate ..
" Id.
37 14 C.F.R. § 61.3(c) (1987). Section 61.3(c) provides that:
Except for free balloon pilots piloting balloons and glider pilots piloting gliders, no person may act as a pilot in command or any other
capacity as required pilot flight crewmember of an aircraft... unless
he has in his personal possession an appropriate current medical
certificate. ...
Id.
38 14 C.F.R. § 121.437(a) (1987).
Section 121.437(a) provides that:
No pilot may act as pilot in command of an aircraft (or as second in
command of an aircraft in a flag or supplemental air carrier or commercial operator operation that requires three or more pilots) unless
he holds an airline transport pilot certificate and an appropriate type
rating for that aircraft.
Id.
39 14 C.F.R. § 61.151(e) (1987). Section 61.151 provides that "[t]o be eligible
for an airline transport pilot certificate, a person must... (e) [h]ave a first-class
medical certificate ....
Id.
40 14 C.F.R. § 67.13(e)(2) (1987).
Section 67.13(e)(2) provides that, "[i]f the
applicant has passed his thirty-fifth birthday but not his fortieth, he must, on the
first examination after his thirty-fifth birthday, show an absence of myocardial infarction on electrocardiographic examination." Id.
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C. Decisions of the Federal Courts
1.

The Federal Tort Claims Act

The Supreme Court examined the discretionary function exception in the seminal decision of Dalehite v. United
States.4 Dalehite involved claims arising from the explosion of ammonium nitrate fertilizer which the government
had manufactured, packaged, stored, and generally controlled pursuant to an overriding plan to increase the
food supply of some foreign countries.42 The explosion
leveled most of Texas City, Texas and killed over five
hundred people. 43 The overriding plan pursued a cabinet-level judgment requiring discretion. 44 Therefore, the
Court applied the exception and found that the government employees acted with impunity.4 5
More importantly, Dalehite articulated the now famous
distinction between non-actionable planning-level negligence and actionable operational-level negligence.4 6
Planning-level acts immune from liability include initiating programs and activities, as well as establishing plans,
specifications, or time schedules.47 Additionally, acts of
subordinates must fall within the same protection. 48 Justice Reed held that, otherwise, the immunity from liability
41

346 U.S. 15 (1953).

Id. at 19-21. Explosives had long used ammonium nitrate as a component,
and much of the ammonium nitrate used in the fertilizer export program was produced in federal munitions plants. Id. at 21. The United States planned to export
the fertilizer to help meet its obligation as an occupying power to feed the populations of Germany, Japan and Korea. Id. at 19.
43 In re Texas City Disaster Litigation, 197 F.2d 771, 772 (5th Cir. 1952).
42

44

Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 37.

Id. at 42-43. The majority held manufacturing, loading, and all other acts
except fire-fighting fell within the Act's exception. Id. at 38-43. No liability attached to the Coast Guard for negligence in fighting the fire caused by the explosion as there was no analogous private liability. Id. at 43-44.
46 Id. at 33-36. The Court, in a 4-3 vote, held:
Where there is room for policy judgment and decision there is discretion. It necessarily follows that the acts of subordinates in carrying out the operations of government in accordance with official
directions cannot be actionable.
Id. at 36.
45

47

48

Id. at 35-36.
Id. at 36.
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would fail when needed.4" It would fail when an employee performed an act at the direction of a superior to
further the policy. 50 Justice Jackson dissented, claiming
that the protection afforded by the discretionary function
exception should not 5extend to all parties carrying out the
government's policy. '
More recently, a unanimous Supreme Court reaffirmed
Dalehite and reduced the scope of government liability
under the FTCA. In a dual-decision, the Court reversed
two appellate court decisions, S.A. Empressa de Viacao Aerea
Rio Grandense v. United States and United Scottish Ins. v.
United States, and issued the single opinion of United States
v. S.A. Empressa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines).52 Varig resulted when a fire broke out in one of the
aft lavatories of a Boeing 707 commercial jet airliner, producing thick, black smoke throughout the cabin.53 The
plane landed successfully, but 124 of the 135 people
aboard died of asphyxiation. 54 The plaintiffs in Varig asserted that the United States was liable for the FAA's implementation of an aircraft spot-check program and the
negligent execution thereof.5 5 United Scottish involved the
crash of a DeHavilland Dove aircraft in October of 1968
49 Id.

50 Id.
, Id. at 58. In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Jackson stated:
The common sense of this matter is that a policy adopted in the exercise of an immune discretion was carried out carelessly by those in
charge of detail. We cannot agree that all the way down the line
there is immunity for every balancing of care against cost, of safety
against production, of warning against silence.
Id.; see, e.g., Hoffman v. United States, 398 F.Supp. 530, 533-38 (E.D. Mich. 1975),
aff'd, 600 F.2d 590 (6th Cir. 1979) (finding no discretion for FAA to ignore federal regulations), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980).
.12 467 U.S. 797 (1984), rev g 692 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1982) and 692 F.2d 1209
(9th Cir. 1982). The Supreme Court reviewed S.A. Empressa de Viacao Aerea
Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines) v. United States, 692 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1982)
and United Scottish Ins. v. United States, 692 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1982) together
because both cases concerned claims that the FAA improperly approved aircraft
for flight.
.- Varig, 467 U.S. at 800.
.54

Id.

. Id. at 801. The Civil Aeronautics Board (the predecessor of the Federal Aviation Administration) failed to inspect the aft lavatory of the Boeing 707 during its
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that resulted from a fire on board the aircraft.56 Although
the FAA performed a complete and mandatory inspection
of that aircraft and its modified cabin heater, it failed to
detect numerous design deficiencies in the heater that
caused the fire.
By concluding that the discretionary function exception
protected FAA employee's execution of the spot-check
program in Varig, the Court reaffirmed its ruling in
Dalehite that a subordinate's action is immune from liability when effectuating the operations of government pursuant to official directions.5 8 The opinion removed all
doubts as to how to construe the discretionary function
exception. 9 In Varig the Court explicitly denounced the
increasingly narrow construction given the exception
since Dalehite.6° Moreover, the Court may have extended
spot-check of the aircraft. The lavatory failed to contain smoke and fire due to its
inadequate design and construction. Id. at 800.
5c Id. at 802.
57 Id. The aircraft had been modified with the installation of a gas-burning
cabin heater. The trial court found that the heater, as installed, exhibited numerous design deficiencies, that should have alerted any reasonably competent FAA
inspector that the overall quality of the design and fabrication of the heater system was not consistent with FAA regulations. Id. at 803.
Id. at 813-14. The Court stated:
As in Dalehite, it is unnecessary - and indeed impossible - to define
with precision every contour of the discretionary function exception.
From the legislative and judicial materials, however, it is possible to
isolate several factors useful in determining when the acts of a Government employee are protected from liability by § 2680(a). First, it
is the nature of the conduct, rather than the status of the actor, that
governs whether the discretionary function exception applies in a
given case.... Second, whatever else the discretionary function exception may include, it plainly was intended to encompass the discretionary acts of the Government acting in its role as a regulator of
the conduct of private individuals.
Id.
, Id. at 810-14. The Court endorses a broad interpretation of the exception by
stating that the rank of the employee does not determine the operational nature
of the negligent act. Id. at 813. "[T]he basic inquiry concerning the application of
the discretionary function exception is whether the challenged acts of a Government employee - whatever his or her rank - are of the nature and quality that
Congress intended to shield from tort liability." Id.; see also Allen v. United States,
816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987).
(, See Note, United States v. Varig: The Supreme Court Narrows the Scope of Government
Liability Under the Federal Torts Claims Act, 51 J. AIR L. & CoM. 197 (1985).
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the discretionary function exception to negligent inspection since it did not distinguish between the spot-check of
the Boeing and the negligent inspection of the DeHavilland Dove. 61
Alabama Electric Cooperative v. United States represents the
Eleventh Circuit's primary interpretation of Varig.62 In Alabama Electric, an electrical cooperative filed suit under the
FTCA to recover the cost of stabilizing a tower allegedly
undermined by erosion after the Army Corps of Engineers constructed dikes in a river. 6 1 Circuit Judge Anderson stated that where the Corps makes a social, economic,
or political policy decision concerning the design of a particular navigation or flood control project, that decision is
excepted from judicial review under the discretionary
function exception.64 However, reliance upon some fixed
or readily ascertainable standard implicates operational
activity.65 The court held that no economic or political
policy decision entered into the Corps' placement of the
dikes.6 6 Thus, the Corps' design decisions were subject to
judicial review under the state law tort standards that
would normally govern an action for engineering
malpractice.67
Another signficant decision involved the Fifth Circuit's
earlier examination of the boundaries of the discretionary
function exception. In Payton v. United States a murder victim's husband and children brought suit under the FTCA,
alleging that the government released a federal prisoner
in total disregard of extensive medical reports confirming
his homicidal and pyschotic tendencies. 68 The Fifth Cir, Id. at 230; see also Proctor v. United States, 622 F. Supp. 10 (C.D. Cal. 1984),
aft'd, 781 F.2d 752 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2918 (1986) (due to broad
language in holding of Varig, a claim for negligence in performing an actual inspection also came within the discretionary function exception).
62 Alabama Elec. Coop. v. United States, 769 F.2d 1523 (11th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 1525.
Id. at 1536-37.
65

Id. at 1537.

6;Id.
67 Id.
- Payton v. United States, 679 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982).
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cuit Judges disagreed as to whether the final act of releasing the prisoner and all antecedent acts of the parole
board were immune from tort action.6 9 Yet, a majority
held that the parole board's negligent review of the prissufficient discretion to be excepted
oner's file involved
70
liability.
from
Pilot Certification Cases

2.

Federal courts have previously dealt with cases of commercial pilots who sought damages for FAA negligence in
failing to issue medical certificates. Duncan v. United
States 7 ' resulted when the Administrator of the FAA twice
revoked the plaintiff's airman medical certificate.72 The
National Transportation Safety Board restored the certificate on administrative appeal. Subsequently, the airline
pilot brought an action for damages against the United
States pursuant to the FTCA, alleging negligence on the
part of the agents and employees of the FAA. 73 The district court concluded that where an applicant, qualifying
under the regulations, deserved a certificate, application
of that regulation to the individual case was an administrative decision at the operational level.7 ' Therefore, negligent application of the medical standards would make
the government liable.75
69 Id. at 476. The Justices submitted seven distinct opinions for publication.

The court stated that "[t]he acquisition and examination of the
70 Id. at 482.
records on which the Board bases its ultimate decision necessarily implicates its
discretionary function." Id.
72

355 F. Supp. 1167 (D.D.C. 1973).
Id. at 1168.

73

Id.

74

Id. at 1170.

71

75 Id.

at 1169. The court reasoned that:
Without a doubt, the decision to make standards for certification of
airmen is a policy-making decision. .

.

. But where clear standards

are set forth to which are matched the actual individual facts, the
courts will hold the judgment to be operational and not
discretionary.
Id. (citation omitted). The court added that:
If the government assumes the responsibility of regulating the commercial air pilot occupation in furtherance of its "end-objective" of
securing air safety, it must do so in a careful manner. The "discre-
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Nearly ten years after Duncan, the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia dealt with the applicability of the discretionary function exception to the
FAA's medical certification process.76 In Beins v. United
States, the FAA denied a commercial pilot his airman's
medical certificate on five occasions. 7 The decision
noted that the FAA's medical regulations fall into three
categories. First, standards exist which leave the FAA little or no discretion of any kind.78 Second, standards exist
which require medical judgment but no balancing of competing policies associated with a discretionary decision.79
Last, standards exist which actually require the FAA to
balance medical judgment with a calculation of whether
the applicant's medical condition permits him to perform
his duties safely.80 Only the last is protected as discretionary. 8 ' The court, to illustrate, claimed that the determination of whether a pilot has an established medical history
or clinical diagnosis of a myocardial infarction requires
medical judgment but no balancing of competing policies
associated with a discretionary function.82 In finding that
the facts of the particular case did place the FAA's actions
in a category protected as discretionary, the appellate
court upheld the district court's decision in the case.83
tionary function" exemption embodied in the Federal Tort Claims
Act should not be used to effect a mantle of protection for negligent
action.
Id. at 1170.
7,;
Beins v. United States, 695 F.2d 591 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
77 Id. at 596.
78

Id. at 603.

79 Id.

8o Id.

81 Id. at 603-04.
82 Id.
8.Id. at 610. In a concurring opinion, Chief Judge S.W. Robinson III stated
that:
To be sure, medical determinations invariably draw on discretion,
but medical rather than governmental judgment is what is generally
utilized. When no "exercise of judgment or discretion of a public
character" is discernible, no basis for invocation of the exemption is
present.
Id. at 614-15 (citations omitted).
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Within a year, the same court followed the reasoning of
both Beins and Duncan. 4 Harr v. United States resulted
when the FAA withdrew the plaintiff's medical certificate
after the pilot suffered injuries and post-traumatic
seizures."5 Upon his recovery, the FAA denied reissuance
of the certificate. 6 The court of appeals ruled that the
FAA has a duty to issue a medical certificate to a pilot if
the pilot meets the FAA's own standards and a related
duty to base any disqualification on a reasonable analysis
of the medical evidence.8 7 The court reiterated that substandard medical or administrative conduct is never exempt from liability under the FTCA. as
II.

HELLER V. UNITED STATES

Richard Heller raised two contentions on appeal. First,
he claimed that the FAA's failure to consult the 1968 EKG
was not within the scope of the discretionary function exception, being a nondiscretionary activity.8 9 Second, Heller contended that since the denial of the certification was
based solely on the FAA's negligent application of the
medical standards concerning myocardial infarctions, 90
and since the application of this standard did not require
the FAA to balance competing policy concerns, his claim
was not barred by the discretionary function exception. 9
Heller did not contest the government's immunity for implementing the airman medical certification program.9 2
94

Harr v. United States, 705 F.2d 500 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

8. Id. at 501. On July 25, 1976, Harr suffered what was diagnosed as post-traumatic seizure. After an additional year of medical care and supervision, Harr's
physicians deemed him fit to fly. Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 503. The Court stated that "an applicant who meets the medical stan-

dards is entitled to an appropriate medical certificate." Id.
8 Id. at 505-06.
- Heller v. United States, 803 F.2d 1558, 1562 (1lth Cir. 1986).
Id. at 1562.

ill Id.
2 Id. at 1564. The court stated that:

Heller concedes that the government's decision to implement the
airman medical certification process is immune from suit under
§ 2680(a), but argues that the FAA's negligent failure to consult the

JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE

894

[53

The court agreed with the government, concluding that
both questions on appeal fell within the discretionary
function exception of the FTCA.93
Justice Anderson, writing for the court, disposed of
Heller's first contention quickly, citing as authority Payton
v. United States. 94 The Heller court drew no distinction between the parole board's review of a psychotic prisoner's
records and the FAA's review of Heller's medical file.95
The court reasoned that both defendants inadequately reviewed the files, but both exercised a degree of discretion
in determining whether or not to review the records more
thoroughly.96 Therefore, the court concluded that the
FAA's failure to compare Dr. Teng's findings with the
FAA's own medical records (which included Heller's 1968
discretion warranting exemption
EKG) involved adequate
97
liability.
tort
from
Heller's second contention presented the court with a
more difficult question.9 8 Relying on Harr, Beins, and
Duncan, Heller asserted that a finding of an established
medical history or clinical diagnosis of myocardial infarction did not implicate the policy making concerns which
are immune from tort action. 99 The Heller court specifically addressed the part of the Beins decision that classified
1968 EKG and negligent application of the medical standard in 14
C.F.R. § 67.13(e)(1)(i) (1986) in the instant case were nondiscretionary activities that do not fall within the scope of the discretionary
function exception.
Id.
Id. at 1559.
Id. at 1564; see supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Payton.
S,4

1)5 Heller, 803 F.2d at 1564.

.. Id. The court stated that "Heller's allegation that the FAA's negligent failure
to consider the 1968 EKG in deciding to withdraw Heller's first-class airman's
medical certificate falls within the scope of the discretionary function exception."
Id.

.7

Id.

"

Id.

Id.; see supra notes 71-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of Harr,
Beins, and Duncan.
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a myocardial infarction diagnosis as non-discretionary. 0 0
Justice Anderson rejected such classification, instead stating that a diagnosis of myocardial infarction requires policy making considerations.' 0 ' Congress drafted medical
regulations for the benefit of the flying public and not for
the benefit of the airman. 0 2 Therefore, the FAA conservatively applies medical standards to avoid any substantial
safety risk.10 3 This concern for safety implicates the policy
concerns protected
by the discretionary function
0 4
exception.1
In deciding the applicability of the discretionary function exception, Justice Anderson followed the guidelines
set forth in Varig.' 0 5 First, he noted that the nature of the
conduct rather than the status of the actor determines the
exception's appropriateness. 10 6 Therefore, it was irrelevant that a mere aviation medical examiner withdrew
Richard Heller's medical certificate. Second, Justice Anderson examined whether the challenged acts of the FAA
were of the nature and quality that Congress intended to
oo Heller, 803 F.2d at 1565; see supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the three categories of FAA medical standards set forth in Beins.
lot Heller, 803 F.2d at 1565. The court stated:
[W]e expressly reject the Beins dicta that the standard at issue in this
case does not implicate policy considerations. We conclude that, in
the context of medical examinations conducted by the FAA to determine whether persons shall be certificated to pilot in air commerce,
the determination of whether an applicant has an "established medical history or clinical diagnosis" of myocardial infarction involves
not only a medical judgment, but also necessarily implicates policy
concerns.
Id.
,02See, e.g., Holmes v. Helms, 705 F.2d 343, 345 (9th Cir. 1983) (FAA regulations to benefit of passenger not the pilot); Dodson v. NTSB, 644 F.2d 647, 651
(7th Cir. 1981) (FAA properly denied medical certificate to a pilot with evidence
of coronary disease).
,,,i
Heller, 803 F.2d at 1566.
,04Id. Justice Anderson states that "[Tlhe FAA in applying the medical standard at issue in the instant case will make its decision in a conservative manner so
as to avoid any substantial safety risk. This consideration of safety ... obviously
implicates the policy concerns protected by § 2680(a)." Id.
105 Heller, 803 F.2d at 1562-63; see supra notes 52-61 and accompanying text for
a discussion of Varig.
1 Heller, 803 F.2d at 1563.
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shield from tort liability.' 0 7 He reasoned that Congress
manifested its concern for the safety of air commerce with
the Federal Aviation Act,1 0 8 and furthermore that the
medical certification program is an integral part of that
program. 0 9 Hence, he concluded the FAA's actions fit
within the four corners of the FTCA's discretionary function exception when judged within the Varig guidelines." l0
The court did not hold that the entire FAA medical certification process falls within the discretionary function."'
Relying on its own decision in Alabama Electric Cooperative
v. United States, the court noted that operational activity
still exists when the government official relies upon some
fixed or readily ascertainable standard." 2 It further
agreed with the D.C. Circuit's articulation in Beins of two
categories of medical certification which require no discretion." 3 The court emphasized that when a particular
decision depends upon scientific or technical information,
the discretionary
function exception is not rendered
4
inapplicable."
III.

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

The Heller decision broadened and further defined governmental immunity under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Yet, the court's opinion did not explicitly exempt the en5
tire FAA medical certification program from liability.' '
Accordingly, this holding will effect the Federal Aviation
Administration, commercial pilots, and other litigants
bringing suit under the Act.
,o7Id. at 1563-66.

....
49 U.S.C. app. § 1421(a) (1982); see supra note 32 for the text.
10949 U.S.C. app. § 1422 (1982 & Supp. 1984); see supra note 33 for the text.
-, Heller, 803 F.2d at 1566-67.
.. Id. at 1565-66.
112

Id. at 1563.

Id. at 1565. The court states that it does not disagree with the Beins articulation of two categories which would not involve a discretionary decision. See supra
text accompanying notes 78-82 for a discussion of the three categories of FAA
medical standards set forth in Beins.
Heller, 803 F.2d at 1563.
"I ld. at 1565-66.
'"'
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Heller provides the FAA with useful precedent for future
lawsuits. The court accepted the agency's argument that
policy considerations entered into its judgment of a pilot's medical fitness with regard to myocardial infarctions. 1 16 This successful defense will again be asserted
alongside the Heller decision should the next case involve
another borderline malady in terms of the Beins classifications. Furthermore, Heller reinforces the belief that Varig
excepted actual negligent inspections from liability.
Pilots, on the other hand, must go to greater lengths to
prove that the challenged acts of the FAA were not of the
nature and quality that Congress intended to shield from
tort liability. Due to Heller, those pilots grounded for indications of myocardial infarction must anticipate summary
dismissal of their cases for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.1 17 Hence, this decision represents unwelcome news
for commercial airline pilots.
Heller also deserves notice for its effect on other litigants under the FTCA. In Varig, the Supreme Court explicitly denounced the increasingly narrow construction
given the discretionary function exception since
Dalehite.118 This decision manifests the same judicial attempt to expand the application of the exception. Therefore, given suitable facts in future cases, the federal courts
are likely to continue expanding the government's immunity within the framework of the FTCA. Future plaintiffs
against any part of the government must go to extensive
lengths to emphasize the operational quality of the challenged actions. They must concentrate their arguments
on those criteria in Beins not overturned by Heller and
those in Alabama Electric. Most importantly, future litigants must effectively distinguish their cases from Varig.
Many people, as well as the lower federal courts, assumed that the government had waived its immunity from
responsibility for negligent conduct that injures individual
I,;Id. at 1566.
Heller v. United States, 620 F. Supp. 270 (M.D. Fla. 1985).
,I See supra notes 52-61 and accompanying text for a discussion of Varig.
1"
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citizens.' 9 Many endorsed the FTCA's apparent policy
that if the citizens at large benefitted from a government
program, that collective citizenry, not the isolated individual injured by the negligent conduct of the program,
would bear the economic burden of that injury.' 20 Heller
illustrates that the FTCA promises little relief for the 2in-

jured party in all but the simplest common law torts.' '
. IV.

CONCLUSION

The court in Heller reached the correct conclusion in affirming the district court's summary dismissal. Admittedly, the medical certification of pilots likens greatly to
the certification of planes. Also, the decision fulfills the
three goals of the discretionary function exception. First,
it promotes the separation of powers by sparing FAA officials from explaining their official actions in court. Second, in areas of policy-making, courts are not equipped to
investigate and weigh the factors which enter into the
FAA's medical certification program. Last, the application of the exception prevented the great and unpredictable cost that could result from judicial re-examination of
the FAA's actions and policies.
The Supreme Court accurately stated that it is impossible to define the exact boundaries of the discretionary
function exception. 2 2 However, more than two hundred
years after the ouster of King George III, it appears that
the King can do very little wrong.' 23 The line between
,,9Allen v. United States, 816 F.2d 1417, 1424 (10th Cir. 1987).

Id.
The legislative reports characterized section 2680(a) as a "highly important
exception" designed to preclude damage suits against the government for such
120

12,

authorized activities as a flood control project, but to allow suits for common law
torts such as the negligent operation of a motor vehicle. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 2730; see H.R. REP. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1942) (report on 1942 version of Tort Claims Act); S. REP. No. 1196, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1942) (report
on 1942 version of Tort Claims Act); H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1945) (report accompanying FTCA as enacted).
122 Varig, 467 U.S. at 813.
123

See supra note 22 and accompanying text for a discussion of sovereign

immunity.
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discretion and operation keeps shifting so that more falls
within the protective mantle of discretion. In Heller, policy favoring public safety excepted the government from
liability. Yet, few regulations exist which do not promote
some beneficial policy goal. Therefore, Heller illustrates
that any court can conclude that discretion was ultimately
involved due to the existence of an underlying salutary
public policy.
David W. Carstens

